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DISMISS, MOTION TO QUASH AND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT PURSUA.'l\TT TO IDAHO 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l)-ADMITRA 
MILLS 
REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO 
ALPHABETICAL INDEX - 8 
Oneida County Case CV-2011-66 
Supreme Court #39878-2012 
05/03/2012 473 III 
08/24/2011 261 II 
09/01/2011 264 II 
08/18/2011 153 I 
08/18/2011 162 I 
06/27/2011 43 I 
-3<3'1-
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l)-ARTIE 
ROSS 
REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l)-CODY 
KELLY 
REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l)-PAUL 
KELLEY JR. 
REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 55 (a) Ac"l\J"D (b)(l)- SANDRA 
COPELAND 
REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT PURSUAJ~T TO IDAHO 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 55 (a) Ac"l\J"D (b)(l)-SMITH 
COUNTY TRUSTEE 
REQUEST FOR CLERK'S ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO IDAHO 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 55 (a) AND (b)(l)- THE ESTATE 
OF PAUL KELLEY SR. 
ALPHABETICAL INDEX - 9 
Oneida County Case CV-2011-66 
Supreme Court #39878-2012 
06/27/2011 111 I 
06/27/2011 74 I 
06/27/2011 63 I 
06/27/2011 52 I 
06/27/2011 96 I 
06/27/2011 85 I 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND REQUEST 
FOR 54(b) CERTIFICATE, FILED 
OCTOBER 18, 2011 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
VERIFIED PLAINTIFF'S REPLY RESPONSE 
TO THE DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S I.R.C.P. RULE 
1 l(a)(2)(B) MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT'S 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED IN 
FAVOR OF GARY BARBER, TAB 
BEALL, LAW OFFICES OF PURDUE, 
BR.ANDON, FELDER, COLLINS & 
MOTT, AND SMITH COlJNTY 
VERIFIED RESPONSES TO COURT ORDER 
DATED AUGUST 18, 2011 Ac~D 
OPPOSING COUNSEL'S OBJECTION 
TO CONTINUANCE OF THIS CASE 
FILED ON AUGUST 16, 2011 
ALPHABETICAL INDEX - IO 
Oneida County Case CV-2011-66 











AKA HOLLI LUNDAHL 
10621 S. Old Hwy 191 
Malad, Idaho 83252 
AT '&':sy O'clock ~M 
2 1 2011 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




SANDRA COPELAND, et al 
Defendants : 
Case No. CV 2011 -- 00066 
VERIFIED 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY RESPONSE TO 
THE DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S l.R.C.P RULE 11 (a)(2)(B) 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 
THE COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF GARY 
BARBER, TAB BEAL, LAW OFFICES 
OF PURDUE, BRANDON, FELDER, 
COLLINS & MOTT, AND SMITH COUNTY 
AND 
REQUEST FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION 
AS TO APPEARING PARTIES 
I. The Defendants Incorrectly Assert That Plaintiff Has Failed To 
Raise Any New Facts That Would Justify Reconsideration 
The defendants are wrong that no new facts were addressed by plaintiffs Rule 
11 (b) reconsideration motion. (See pags 5-7 of Defendant's Opposition). 
This Court in it's memorandum decision entered on October 3, 2011, raised 
several defenses for the defendants sua sponte which were arguably waived by the 
defendants given the defendants did not raise the following defenses themselves in their 
motions to dismiss, to wit: 
(1) The court asserted that Plaintiff formed and consummated her unilateral 
acceptance contract to the defendants unilateral sales offer published over the 
defendant's website -- in the state of Texas. The Court then set out a series of 
incorrect ultimate facts in support of the Court's contact theory. Plaintiff corrected this 
court's factual errors by pointing to the existing affidavits and previously verified facts in 
the record, and by presenting new facts to correct this court's self imposed facts ; all of 
which proved that plaintiff's unilateral acceptance contract was formed and consumated 
in the state of Idaho where plaintiff signed her acceptance contract through an Idaho 
notary and furnished the consideration for the transaction from Idaho resources; thereby 
fully performing on the unilateral offer by the defendants - in the state of Idaho. 1 
(2) This court also introduced another defense on behalf of the defendants that 
these defendants never argued in their motion to dismiss, to wit That Smith County 's 
internet sales offer derived from a passive website. Plaintiff filed an affidavit and attached 
documents from Smith County's Real Estate website which showed that Smith County's 
sales offer was posted on a "very active website" which provided all of the necessary 
tools and paperwork to purchase property from Smith County, as well as directions for 
payment to secure the sales transaction. 2 (In Defendant's footnote 2 of their Opposition 
response, the defendants claim that plaintiffs four exhibits attached to Holli's October 
18, 2011 declaration are irrelevant to the matters at hand. This is a false assertion. 
Exhibits 1-2 show the interactive nature of Smith County's real estate website. Exhibit "3" 
is a recorded phone call from Lois Mosley who acted as Smith County's selling agent . 
The defendants assert that because Ms. Mosley is not a party to this action, any 
recorded phone call by her is irrelevant. Plaintiff attested that the acts of Ms. Mosley on 
behalf of her boss were very relevant to this litgation and to any holding by the court that 
1. Under the doctrine of lex loci contractus, a contract is considered 
consummated, formed and executed where the contract is signed. See Gates v. Collier, 
378 F .2d 888 (91h Cir. 1967) (This circuit adopts the rule of lex loci contractus set forth in 
Restatement of the law of the Conflicts of Law § 332 and which makes the law of the 
place where the contract is signed determine the validity, meaning and effect of an 
agreement.). Ray v. Frasure, 200 P.3d 1174, 146 Idaho 625 (ID 2009) (a contract is 
consummated when it is reduced to writing and signed.); Contract formation occurs when 
consideration is tendered to form the contract. Mitchell v. Siqueros, 582 P.2d 1074; 99 
Idaho 396 (Idaho 1978) (Contract formation occurs when consideration is given to form 
the contract.). 
2. A website is not passive where it provides a means to purchase goods or 
products or services. See Holland America Line Inc. v. Wartsila North America, Inc., 485 
F.3d 450 (9th Cir. 2007) (Defining passive website as one that does not provide any 
means for purchasing items or requesting services.) 
Smith County be directed to convey title in the property to plaintiff under a constructive 
trust theory. It is a well accepted principle that the acts of the servant are attributed to the 
master and that the true party in interest in the action is Smith County, not her employee 
Lois Mosley. Acordingly, plaintiff did not have to name Lois Mosley to the lawsuit as 
Lois Mosley has no personal interest in the matter at hand. Exhibit "4" is Ferron Stokes 
certificate showing that he is licensed to do business in the state of Idaho and was 
presented in support of plaintiffs attested claim that Ferron Stokes has taken over the 
$66,000 debt obligation incurred by plaintiff in this transaction, due to an illegal search 
conducted on plaintiffs home which impeded plaintiffs ability to earn an income to sustain 
her obligations. Exhibit "4" further supports plaintiffs tortious injury prong to hold 
jurisdiction over the action in the state of Idaho where the illegal effects of the defendant's 
action were felt.) Hence, contrary to opposing counsel's assertions, plaintiffs exhibits 
are very material to the procedural and substantive matters before this court. 
(3) Finally, the court indirectly asserted that because land can't be transferred 
from Texas to Idaho, any injury suffered as a result of a breached land sales contract 
should be resolved in Texas. However, Idaho has never prohibited the prosecution of 
suits seeking the conveyance of title to foreign land, as long as personal jurisdiction can 
be acquired over the seller in Idaho under the tortious injury prong of Idaho's long arm 
statute. The hallmark case for this legal conclusion is Andre v. Morrow, 680 P.2d 
1355; 106 Idaho 455 (Idaho 1984) 3 Like in Morrow infra, the defendants have 
3. In Andre v. Morrow, 680 P.2d 1355; 106 Idaho 455 (Idaho 1984) 
the Idaho Supreme Court gave the following analysis: 
Plaintiff-Respondent (Andre) brought an action in California against defendants-
appellants (Morrows), Idaho residents, to impose a constructive trust on certain real 
property located in Idaho, in which the Morrows held legal title and which Andre 
asserted they had allegedly acquired through fraud committed upon Andre's 
conservtee. The California Court ruled in favor of Andre and ordered the Morrows to 
convey the title to Andre. Andre filed a copy of the California judgment with the Clerk of 
the District Court for Nez Perce County, Idaho, and sought full faith and credit on the 
judgment. The Morrows attacked the California judgment asserting that it was not 
entitled to recognition because the California court lacked jurisdiction to directly affect title 
to property located in Idaho. This contention is error. 
It is well settled that upon a finding of personal jurisdiction, a court of a 
foreign state can issue a personal judgment ordering a conveyance of real property 
by a party before that court and that this is a valid exercise of a court's power. 
Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal.2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); Idaho Gold Mining Co. v. Winchell, 6 
3 
likewise committed fraud upon plaintiff herein to the tune of $66,000 sufficient for this 
court to impose a constructive trust on the property and order conveyance of title to 
plaintiff. 4 In fact, plaintiff represented from the outset that immediate conveyance of 
title was her ultimate goal to mitigate damages. Accordingly the defendants will not be 
able to use this as a defense. 
In addition, the defendants have not denied that they entered into a unilateral 
contract with an Idaho resident and that plaintiff performed on that contract from the state 
of Idaho. 5 The defendants have also not denied that Plaintiff committed to loan 
Idaho 729, 59 P. 533 (1899); Millerv. Miller, 109 Misc.2d 982, 441N.Y.S.2d339 (1981); 
Blue River Sawmills, Ltd. v. Gates, 225 Or. 439, 358 P.2d 239 (1960); Silver Surprize, Inc. 
v. Sunshine Mining Co., 74 Wash.2d 519, 445 P.2d 334 (1968); 50 C.J.S. Judgments§ 
889 h. (1947), Lorenzen, Application of Full Faith and Credit Clause to Equitable Decrees 
for the Conveyance of Foreign Land, 34 Yale L.J. 591 (1925); 50 C.J.S. Judgments§ 889 
h. (1947). Specifically, full faith and credit has been extended to foreign equity 
decrees which order an in personam conveyance of land located in another 
state. Varone v. Varone, 359 F.2d 769 (7th Cir.1966); Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal.2d 322, 
317P.2d11 (1957); lveyv. Ivey, 183 Conn. 490, 439A.2d 425 (1981); Weesnerv. 
Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682 (1959); Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, supra ; 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 102 comment d (1971 ). 
The California court determined that it had personal jurisdiction over the 
Morrows under the tortious injury prong of California's long arm statute through the fraud 
committed by the Morrows upon the conservetee, a California resident. We affirm the 
trial court's judgment directing the Morrows to convey title in the real property to Andre. 
Furthermore the Morrows are to pay attorneys fees and costs. 
4. A constructive trust arises where legal title to property has been obtained 
through actual fraud, misrepresentations, concealments, taking advantage of one's 
necessities, or under circumstances otherwise rendering it unconscionable for the holder 
of legal title to retain beneficial interest in the property. Davenport v. Burke, 30 Idaho 599, 
167 P. 481 (1917). 
5. Unilateral contracts are consumatted where the offeree accepts the terms 
of the unilateral offer and performs thereunder to secure the promises in the offer. See 
Evanston Insurance Company v. Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance Company; Case 
No. 10-36133 (9th Cir. 10/03/2011). This court cited Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel v. 
Cal-Cut, 567 P.2d 1246; 98 Idaho 495 (ID 1977) asl isting similar facts to plaintiffs case. 
Southern Idaho was a unilateral contract case. See also Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of 
America, supra, 93 Idaho at 30, 454 P.2d 63 (In these modern times, jurisdiction has 
been expanded to cover contacts with a state that fall far short of a physical presence 
citing Fullmer v. Sloan's Sporting Goods, Co., 277 F.Supp. 995 (1967) . In such 
instance the analytic emphasis is placed on assessing whether the defendants realized a 
pecuniary benefit in the transaction from an Idaho resident. 
obligations in the state of Idaho as an Idaho resident in order to consummate the 
transaction. 6 None of these "contact injuries are addressed anywhere in the Court's 
October 3, 2011 Memorandum Decision. 
Finally, the defendants deny that plaintiff put forth any evidence proving her 
acceptance contract was formed in Idaho. (Defendant's Response Opposition @page 7, 
lines 8-9.). Plaintiff testified under oath that she signed her acceptance contract in Idaho 
and notarized same with an Idaho notary; plaintiff provided wire transfers of monies 
from her bank bearing her Idaho member address as consideration for the transaction; 
and plaintiff provided affidavits from Idaho mortgagees claiming the extension of credit in 
the state of Idaho for the underlying transaction. Given all of the consideration for the 
transaction generated from the state of Idaho, the contract was formed in Idaho --- as 
without consideration, there is no contract. 
According to the foregoing, the defendants claim that there is no evidence in the 
record lacks merit. 
II. The Defendants Incorrectly Assert That Plaintiff Failed To 
Show How The Court Errored In The Law 
The Defendants admit that plaintiff attacked the court's "contract analysis" 
rendered in it's Memorandum Decision in her Rule 1 i motion for reconsideration, but 
deny that plaintiff made any showing that the court violated the law in it's Decision. 
Commencing on Page 3 of plaintiffs rule 11 (b) motion for reconsideration, 
plaintiff argued : 
The Court errored when it limited anaylsis of plaintiffs case to a contract 
case and omitted material facts to fashion a decision which denied plaintiff 
jurisdiction in the state of Idaho. . .. Plaintiffs case more so alleges tortious 
6. Monetary obligations in forum state will hold jurisdiction. Vreeken v. 
Lockwood Engineering, B.V., 218 P.3d 1150, 148 Idaho 89 (Idaho 2009) (loans obtained 
locally for business purposes result in contact with forum.). See also Nike USA, Inc. v. 
Pro Sports Wear, Inc., No. A 128283 (Or.App. 10/11 /2006) (Where financial credit is 
extended to support an transaction, personal jurisdiction may be imposed by the debtor 
where the debtor suffers the effects.) 
5 
injury intentionally inflicted upon Plaintiff in the state of Idaho through fraud 
and resulting in unjust enrichment in the defendant's favor. The Court has 
wholly failed to conduct any analysis of plaintiffs fraud, unjust enrichment 
and constructive trust claims under the tortious injury prong of Idaho's Long 
Arm Statute." 
In Yahoo Inc v. La Ligue Cantre Lw Raciseme Et L'Antisenitiseme, 433 F.3d 
1199 (9th Cir. 2006) , the 9th circuit held that the court is required to conduct a full analysis 
of all prongs under California's long arm statute before reaching a decision on personal 
jurisdiction. Quoting: 
" We treat "purposeful availment" somewhat differently when addressing " 
tort and contract claims. In tort claims, we inquire whether a defendant 
purposefully direct[s] his activities at the forum state, applying an "effects 
test" that focuses on the forum in which the defendant's actions were felt, 
whether or not the actions themselves occurred within the forum. See 
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 
789-90 (1984)). By contrast, in contract claims, we inquire whether a 
defendant "consummate[s] [a] transaction" in the forum, focusing on 
activities such as delivering goods to or executing a contract in the forum 
state. Both anaylsis' must be conducted to determine if one or the other 
will sustain jurisdiction. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held similar in Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler LLC, 
152 P.3d 594, 143 Idaho 723 (Idaho 2008). Here, the court ackowledged that although 
Blimka had presented an argument under both the doing business prong and the tortious 
injury prong of Idaho's long arm statute, the court decisioned that the doing business 
prong addressing the contract contacts with the state nee not be reached, because it was 
clear that personal jurisdiction could be sustained over the defendants under the tortious 
injury prong of the Idaho Long Arm Statute. The Court held that the defendant had 
committed fraud on an Idaho resident and caused that resident to part with money based 
on misrepresentations. The Blimka Court affirmed the rule that where the victim suffers 
injury from tortious actions of a defendant in their resident state, Idaho will not condone 
such wrongs committed against it's citizens. See also Gates v. Collier, 378 F.2d 888 (9th 
Cir. 1967) (With respect to that portion of Collier's claim which is based on fraud, § 377 of 
the Restatement recites that "When a person sustains loss by fraud, the place of wrong 
is where the loss is sustained, not where fraudulent representations are made."); Affirmed 
in Yahoo Inc v. La Ligue Cantre Lw Raciseme Et L'Antisenitiseme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 
2006) (We hold jurisdiction proper in California from a letter sent to Yahoo threatening 
financial penalties against Yahoo which would be suffered where Yahoo resided.). 
There is no question that plaintiff sustained losses in her forum state of Idaho and 
that the Court wholly failed to address plaintiffs claims under the tortious injury prong of 
the Idaho Long Arm Statute or to follow the teaching in Blimka supra. 
The defendants provide absolutely no argument on this legal error committed by 
the court. Therefore, the defendants have effectively conceded that jurisdiction in Idaho 
would exist under the tortious injury prong. 
Ill. Plaintiff Argued That Rule 4(i) Conflicts Itself And Is 
A First Impression Question That Should be Raised To 
The Idaho Supreme Court 
The defendants rehash their argument made in support of rule 4(i) and 
misrepresent the nature of plaintiffs attack on this rule. Plaintiff argued that Rule 4(i) 
conflicts with itself because in one phrase it allows a party to merge merits defenses with 
special appearance defenses and argue them all at once, and in another phrase, it 
condems such action by requiring the defendant to argue his speial appearance defense 
before briefing a merits defense. Plaintiff asked the court to analyze this first impression 
conflict because the court failed to do so in it's memorandum decision entered on October 
3, 2011. The defendants have likewise not addressed this conflict which still remains 
alive as a first impression question for the Supreme Court. 
IV. This Court Has No Authority To Interfere With Plaintiffs 
Settlement Negotations With Lisa Nielsen And Must 
Affirm Dismissal Of Her Claim With Prejudice Pursuant To 
The Settlement Negotations Between The Parties 
In Baileyv. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 86 P.3d 458 (Idaho 2004): the Idaho 
Supreme Court citing Payne v. Foley, 102 Idaho 760, 639 P .2d 1126 (1982) affirmed 
there is no authority for a trial court to second guess settlement negotiations. Settlement 
agreements are binding when acted upon or entered on the court records. Kohring, 137 
Idaho at 99, 44 P.3d at 1154; Conley v. Whittlesey, 126 Idaho 630, 633, 888 P.2d 804, 
807 (Ct. App. 1995). 
1 
Here, plaintiff and Lisa Nielsen entered into a Rule 68 settlement contract 
regarding Texas property that Lisa Nielsen defaulted on. Plaintiff as substitute trustee for 
the lender, agreed to forego foreclosure proceedings associated with the Texas property 
if Lisa Nielsen sent Texas recording official Ann Carraway Bruce a conveyance 
instrument which transferred title to Jim Keddington; thus avoiding the more costly 
foreclosure proceedings. As set forth in Lisa Nielsen's affidavit, Jim Kedddington 
provided Lisa with email confirmation he had received from Ann Caraway Bruce admitting 
to issuance of an official letter regarding a voluntary conveyance, but at no time thereafter 
did Jim receive any official letter from Ms. Bruce. 
Accordingly, plaintiff executed a foreclosure deed to Jim Keddington sometime 
on or about December 28, 2010. 
Ann Caraway Bruce forwarded the foreclosure deed to the Dallas County clerk 
for recordation. The Texas clerk refused to record the executed deed. 
Lisa Nielsen and plaintiff agreed that plaintiff would include Lisa as a defendant 
in this action so that all of plaintiffs Texas property claims against Lisa Nielsen would be 
forever judicially foreclosed based on agreed assignment of Lisa Nielsen's tort claims 
against the Texas county officials to Jim Keddington. As soon as plaintiff personally 
served Lisa Nielsen, the parties entered in a prejudicial Rule 68 settlement agreement to 
the foregoing effect. As aforstated, this court has no authority to interfere with or second 
guess plaintiff and Lisa Nielsen's settlement agreement. Accordingly, this court must 
dismiss plaintiffs claims against Lisa Nielsen with prejudice based on the Rule 68 
settlement agreement between the parties. 
V. The Defendants May Have Merit To Their Rule 54(b) 
Certification Argument-- So Plaintiff Witdraws This 
Argument, Asks The Court To Dismiss Her Claims 
Against The Remaining Defendants Without Prejudice 
For Alleged Lack Of Proper Service And To Enter A 
Final Judgment In This Action For Immediate Appeal 
Plaintiff has read the defendants argument that this case is not proper for rule 
54(b) certification which is reportedly reserved for cases based on a compelling need for 
interlocutory appeal. The defendants have correctly asserted that plaintiffs limitation 
period for allegedly properly serving the remaining defendants will expire on December 3, 
2011, that this court can then dismiss the remaining parties allegedly improperly served 
without prejudice and enter a final judgment in the action. Plaintiff agrees with 
Defendant's argument, and furthermore jump starts the final disposition of this action. 
Plaintiff previously argued that she contended that service by certified mail as 
provided under Idaho's consumer protection act was proper. This Court ruled that it was 
not, that personal service had to be effected. Plaintiff accordingly personally served all 
of the specially appearing defendants herein and submitted the returns of personal 
service to this court. 
Plaintiff now confirms to this court that she will not be effecting personal service on 
the remainder defendants and that this court may dismiss plaintiff's claims against these 
defendants without prejudice on November 21, 2011 based upon this court's finding that 
plaintiff did not properly serve the remaining defendants when she employed service by 
certified mail. 
After the dismissal of the remainder defendants on November 21, 2011, this 
court will have disposed of all of plaintiff's claims and then can enter a final rule 58 
dismissal judgment to allow this case to proceed through the appellate court system. 
VERIFICATION 
I, Holli Telford, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose~and says: 
That I prepared the foregoing pleading and affirm thMPrePerl'}t states the facts 
presented by me and the laws which ar.?__applieatife to my case. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS __ DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2011 
SARAH STROllNEU 
liotlrJ Pllblic • Sla!t <i Utah 
Conimission # 578125 
COW EXP. 03-0>2013 
--c~-r---'-'--{/\_· -~-··_.'-:· ____ . ____ Notary Public 
FROM : 
Hom Telford 
10621 S. Old Hwy 191 
Malad City, Idaho 83252 
208-766-5559 
FAX NO. Feb. 08 2012 12:35AM Pi 
':d AT ~O'clock A M 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




Sandra Copeland, et aL 
Defendants 
Case No. 2011-CV-0066 
Notice of Filing Re-Notarized 
Affidavit of Holli Telford To Replace 
The Original Affidavit of Holli Telford 
Dated July 18, 2011 And Filed In 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
SMITH COUNTY, GARY BARBER, 
ATTORNEY TAB BEALL, AND LAW 
OFFICES OF PURDUE, BRANDON, 
FELDER, COLLINS AND MOTT'S 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ... 
Based On Tampering With the Original 
Affidavit By Oneida County Officials 
Thus Rendering The Original Affidavit 
lncompenterit 
Hearing Date: February 14, 2012 
@ 3:30 p.m.· 
Comes Now Holli Telford and Notices this Court that she forthwith files a re-
notarizied Affidavit of Holli Telford attached hereto as exhibit "1" to replace the Affidavit 
of Holli Telford dated July 18, 2011 and filed in OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS SMITH 
COUNTY, GARY BARBER, ATTORNEY TAB BEALL AND LAW OFFICES OF PURDUE, 
BRANDON, FLEDER, COLLINS AND MOTTS MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ... based on tampering with the original affidavit by Oneida 
County officials subsequent to a search and seizure of this document on August 10, 2011 
; thus rendering the original affidavit incompetent. 
1~ 
FROM : FAX ND. Feb. 08 2012 12:37AM P2 
-·-·-~-,, .. _ ,_,,_ ,.~-" ---
In addition, plaintiff incorporates the original exhibits attached to the July 18, 
2011 Affidavit of Holli Telford as if fully set forth herein -- in support of this newly 
reconstituted affidavit. 
Dated: Februaiy 7, 2012 
Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certffies that she fax served the foregoing document on the 
following persons on the date affixed to this document 
Stephen Adams: fax no. 208-344-5510 
Oneida County District Court fax no. 208-766-29 
Judge Dunn fax no. (208) 236-7208 
FROM : 
HOLLI TELFORD 
10621 S. OLD HWY 191 
MALAD CITY, IDAHO 83262 
ATTORNEY PRO SE 
208-473-5800 
FRX NO. Feb. 08 2012 12:37AM P3 
FEB - 8 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
HOLLI TELFORD assignee to M.D. 
Trust 
· Plaintiff 
SANDRA COPELAND, et al. 
Defendants 
STATE OF IDAHO 




Case No. CV 2011-000066 
AFFIDAVIT OF HOLLI TELFORD 
IN OPPOSITION T.O DEFENDANTS 
SMITH COUNTY, TAX ASSESSOR GARY 
BARBER, A ITORNEY TAB BEALL AND 
LAW OFFICES OF PURDUE, BRANDON, 
FELDER, COLLINS AND MOTT'S 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
HOLLI TELFORD, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That the attestments made herein are made of affiant's own personal 
knowledge and are true and correct to the best of Affiant's knowledge. 
2. I am the purchaser of the subject struck off property offered for "resale" 
(emphasis added) by the taxing unit Smith County Texas over the internet 
3. I contend that personal jurisdiction exists over the county entities and 
lawtirm under: (1) Idaho's Consumer Protection Act, (2) the Idaho Racketeering Act 18 
LC.§ 780i et seq. for the following predicate crimes: 18 LC.§ 2403 (Theft by unauthorized 
transfer); 181.C. § 2403 (d) (Theft by false promise); 181.C. § 2403(e) (Theft by extortion); 
18 l.C. § 2407 (a) (Extortion by public setvant in failing to perform an official duty, in 
such manner as to affect some person adversely and resulting in grand t'left:) ; and 18 LC. 
§ 1905 (Falsification of corporate books); (3) Idaho's Long Arm Statute; and (4) the Due 
/, 
FROM : FAX NO. Feb. 08 2012 12:38RM P4 
--~···--
Process Clause of the US Constitution. 
4. f purchased this struck off property bearing situs address 14811 FM 2661 
Flint Texas from a resale list posted by Smith County over their website. This list is 
attached as exhibit "1" to my verified complaint My plans were to re~ sell the property to 
Affiant Elham Nielsen as soon as I received the trustee's deed. 
5. In conducting a search on this property, I pulled down the Smith County 
Appraidal District's Website and did an address search on this property. I learned that the 
property bearing situs address 14811 FM 2661, Flint Texas Belonged to Joseph and Tammy 
Conflitti. Attached as exhibit "2" to my verified complaint is the Smith County Appraisal 
Districfs property address search result verifying this information. Two parcels bear this 
address. I was told by the Smith County Tax Assessor's office before I placed my bid that 
' 
the parcel with the barn I residence was the property up for re-sale by the Smith County 
Trustee. 
6. Before a bid can be made on struck off property owned by the County 
Taxing unit, Texas law requires that the bidder obtain a written statement regarding 
delinquent property taxes in Texas under Texas Tax Code 34.015. I obtained this statement 
from the County Tax assessor clerk Janie Flores. Before I obtained this Statement, I had to 
provide Ms Flores wrJi a copy of my Idaho Driver's License bearing the address of 10621 S. 
Old Hwy 191, Malad, Idaho 83252. When the clerk verified my identity via my drivers 
license, I paid the clerk with a check which had my Idaho address affixed thereto. Attached 
hereto as exhibit "1" is a redacted copy of the cancelled check paying for this Statement and 
bearing as the payee Gary Barber-Tax Assessor with the c;<;lnceled side of the check showing 
a stamp reading: "For Deposit Only Smith County Tax Collector". Following this check is the 
Statement for which the check was issued. 
7. In addition, when I presented my bid for the struck off property t'lat Smith 
County was attempting to re-sell, I tendered a letter of credit (aka letter of approval) from 
the same bank as my check in exhibit "1" attached, was drawn. See a true copy of my letter 
of credit as exhibit M2" attached hereto. 
8. Oneida County, Idaho has always had my legal phone number as 208-
473-5800. This phone number is tied into my computer and records all incoming calls on a 
magic jack softphone. I am able to take a digital picture of the soft-phone end convert to pdf 
format to preserve U1is evidence which will be addressed later in this declaration. 
9. l showed Ms. Nielsen, Ms. Vogt and their family members how to monitor 
- 401.f-
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the tax purchase I was making with Smith County Texas. ! also involved these persons and 
others in every step involved in acquiring and improving the struck off property - until such 
time this property was to be resold to Elham Nielsen. Hence these persons were aware of 
the actual purchasing offer made by Smith County over their website, were witnesses to my 
phone conversations with Smith County officers, and accompanied me to Texas on April 30, 
2011 when I sought to take possession of the properties as the bona fide purcahser and 
assess it for needed improvements before conveying it to Elham Nielsen. 
10. I made an original bid on the subject property of $12,001 based on false 
representations by Smith County officials that I was bidding on the barn I residence and 
acreage owned by the Conflittis. The "online" Bid deadllne for the property was set for . 
March 31, 2011 at noon. Lois Mosley was the Smith County Tax Assessor Officer handling 
this sale. Because this property was a resale property owned by the taxing unit, this 
property was not subject to redemption under Texas Tax Code § 34.23 (b) providing: "the 
owner of property sold for taxes to a taxing unit may not redeem the property from the taxing 
unit after the property has been resold. D Consequently, when I obtained my fetter of credit 
from my bank which agreed to fund a loan if I won the bid, I informed the bank that there 
would be no risk of redemption and that I would obtain a letter from the selling agent to that 
effect should a demand be placed on my letter of credit. I was also referred to Texas 
Tax Code§ 34.0S(d) by Smith County officials as assurance that if I won the bid, Smith 
County officials were bound to accept my bid and tender me a trustees Deed. Texas Tax 
Code§ 34.05(d) reads in part as follows: RESALE BY TAXING UNIT: 
The acceptance of a bid by an officer conducting the sale is conclusive 
and binding. On conclusion of the sale, the officer making the sale shall 
prepare a deed to the purchaser. The county clerk shall file and record 
each deed under this subsection and after recording shall return the deed 
to the grantee. 
11. Myself and Elham arranged to have affiant Kim Vogt appear at the Tax 
Assessor's office on March 31, 2011 at noon to hear the announced winners of my bid on the 
subject struck off property. Kim Vogt did appear at the Smith County Tax Assessor's office 
at 11 :30 a.m. on March 31, 2011 to hear the winning bidders. As attested to by Kim and as 
confirmed to me by the official conducting the sale Lois Mosley, I was the "only" bidder and 
the winning bidder on the struck off property bearing situs address 14811 FM 2661 Flint, 
Texas. After the sale, Lois Mosley told Kim that it would take approximately 3 months to 
$. 
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execute the Trustee's deed during which time the County would be making a demand on my 
letter of credit 
9. On April 4, 2011, at about 10:00 a.m., the County's lawfirm constructing 
the deed, ie, Linebarger, Goggan, Blair and Sampson called me at my number 208-473~ 
5800 to confirm how the deed should read. There number is 903-593--8426. At 1:52 P.M. on 
April 4, 2011, a Smith County Tax Assessor official called me at my Idaho number to officially 
inform me that I was the winner of the bid on the subject real property and that it would take 
approximately three months to execute the Trustee's deed and record said deed with the 
county clerk's office. At 2:37 p.m. on April 4, 2011, the officer conducting the sale· - Lois 
Mosley - called me at my Idaho number to inquire into the demand for performance on my · 
letter of credit to pay for the property. I informed Lois that she wotdd need to execute a 
letter from her office and bearing her official seat which: (a) announced me as the winner of 
the re-sale auction, {b) indicated that Smith County had accepted my bid and that the bid 
was conclusive and binding (less fraud in the transaction), (c) informed the bank that Smith 
County was exercising their demand on my letter of credit. and (d) verify that I was the 
successful bona fide purchaser of the property in question so that I could now possess the 
property and make improvements thereto. Lois informed me that she would get back to me 
on this issue of preparing a letter. Attached hereto as exhibit "3" is the digital camera picture 
I took of my magic jack phone verifying these incoming calls to me on April 4, 2011. 
10. On April 5, 2011, I received an email from the County's law office 
preparing the deed for the sale. An employee of their office was sending me a Jetter 
confiiming purchase of the subject property so that I could obtain immediate insurance on the 
property. This letter was sent to my Idaho address and forwarded to my insurance earner. 
Attached hereto as exhibit "4m is the conformation email I was sent by the Law Offices of 
Linebarger, Goggan, Blar and Sampson. I did obtain the required ins~rance. 
11. On April 6, 2011, . I call~d Lois Mosley to inform her that the demand letter 
executed to my bank should also confirm that the sale w.as binding ·and not subject to any 
redemption rights. During this conversation, Lois Mosley asked me to prepare a form letter 
that had the necessary language needed to exercise my letter of credil On April 8, 2011, I 
faxed Lois a form demand letter for her to execute with the official seal of her office. Lois 
faxed me this letter back after she executed it. Attached hereto as exhibit "5" is this executed 
form letter to be placed with the bank upon demand by Lois. 
12. On April 30, 2011, myself, El ham. Kim and members of their family 
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traveled to Texas to take possession of the struck off property I had purchased. When we 
arrived, we went onto the propert and were greeted by an employee of Conflitti. We were 
advised by this person that Joseph Conflitti's property had not been put up for sale nor had 
it been defaulted to Smith County for failure to pay property taxes. Upon recieing this 
information, we all appeared at the Smith County Tax office on the early morning hours of 
May 2, 2011 to complain. We were deferred to a Smith County Tax Appraiser who 
acknowledged the property address error made on Smith County's Struck off property list and 
directed us to the correct property owned by Smith County and which did not have an 
assigned sjtus address. The lot re-sold by Smith County adjoined Conftittis property on the 
southeast end. 
13. We went to look at the struck off property. ·This property was a small 
lot, with garbage debris everywhere. It was dear that it had been used as a garbage dump 
for many years. In addition, the claimed residence on this site was a burned out building 
beyond repair. I took pictures of the inside of the building for purposes of presenting the 
pictures to Lois Mosley who conducted the tax sale and in support of a modification of my bid 
to reflect the true market value of the property. Texas Tax Code§ 34.01(0) pennitted the 
county official conducting 1he sale to offer a lower amount then requested at tl-ie sale, and 
further, placed a duty on the official to reopen the bidding at the amount of my bid and bid 
off the property to me {especially where fraud was committed in the sale.} .. With this statute 
in mind, we reappeared at the Tax office again that afternoon so that I could raise these 
new issues with Lois Mosley. 
· 14. I spoke to Lois and complained about the misrepresenrauons in the sale 
of the subject property. I informed Ms. Mosrey that I would buy the County's property for the 
market I assessed value of the land only, that the alleged building on the property which was 
valued at $43,254 actually had a -0~ demofition value as a significantlr burned out building 
infested with black mold, and that I would agree to pay for the demolition of the building ff 
county hauled off the debris at their cost All of us present, witnessed Lois Mosley go into 
Gary Barber's office which had glass partitions on the wall that allowed people to see into 
Gary Barber's office and discuss my fraud issues with Gary Barber, the Smith County Tax: 
Collector. We all further witnessed Lois exit Gary Barber's office , approach me, and 
instruct me to: (a) execute a corrected bid nun pro tune to a day before the bidding closed 
and bid the assessed value of the property only, (b) execute a written statement describing 
the conflict which justified the county's actions under Texas Tax Code section 34.01 (o) in re-
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selling the property to me at a lower value, (c) send Lois pictures of the inside of the 
building via email so that Lois could assess the building's demolition value at -0-; and (d) 
execute a request to Lois for debris cleanup at the County's costs to avoid liability under 
Smith County, City of Tyler Code Ordinance Sec. 16-8 entitled: Disposal of construction and 
demolition waste . . which would not be removed except by special arrangement prior to 
disposal. Furthermore, a county resolution would have to be passed to waive the charge for 
removal and disposal of this waste pursuant to Ord. No. 0-97-53, 1115/97. In conclusion, 
Lois confirmed that it was okay fOr me and those working with me, to occupy and improve 
the property re-sold to me by the County - given redemption was not an issue. There-. 
after I submitted Lois Mosley's demand letter to my bank to releas~ the amount of $4200, and 
no more, under my letter of credit to pay far the struck off property. 
15. On May 6, 2011, I did execute the written statement requested by Lois 
Mosley and this statement was immediately personally served by LA Greer upon the 
Smith County Tax Assessor through employee Lois Mosley and upon the law offices of 
Linebarger, Blair, etc., the latter performing the function of preparing and recording the 
Trustee's Deed. I also tendered another bid offer nun pro tune to the close date on the 
original bid sale, and within the terms of my modified agreement with Smith County 
employee Lois Mosley. Attached as exhibit "3" to my verified complaint is my "nun pro tune 
bid" authorized by Texas Tax Code 34.01(0). The statement served on the Smith County 
Tax Assessor's office is attached to Tax Assessor/ Collector Gary Barber's affidavit of his 
exhibit "D". In the First paragraph of the Statement, lines 5-6 of Barber's eXhibit"D", I 
proclaitned that I was "an out of state buyer"'. Given the Tax Assessor I Collector 
produced this evidence, then he has also judicially admitted that he knew that I resided in 
Idaho throughout the re-sale of this struck~off property to me, contrary to his perjurious 
affidavit stating otherwise. 
16. Immediately after we served this statement upon Lois Mosley, f emailed to 
Lois in 6 different emails pdf copied pictures of the fire damages to the garage/office unit on 
the struck off property. I also emailed lois the demolition work that we had done commencing 
May 3,2011 and forward. Attached hereto as exhibit "6" is my email record showing more 
than 6 emails sent to Lois Mosley delivering these pictures. Attached hereto as exhibit "7" 
are the fire damaged pictures of the buiiding on the struck off property and pictures of the 
demolition work performed by us; said demolltlon trash to be removed by the County at their 
expense. ***Actual pictures will be emailed to the parties and the court for better clerity. 
FROM FAX NO. Feb. 08 2012 12:41RM P 
17. The entire time we were at the property performing demolition work and 
otherwise clearing the property for installation of a manufactured home pursuant to my 
modified sales agreement with Ms. Nielsen, the prior owners who defaulted on the property 
i.e. members of the estate of Paul Kelley Sr., repeatedly came onto the property to inquire to 
it's status. At all times herein mentioned, the defaulted owners were told by me in front of 
Elham, Kim. family members, construction crew members, and heavy equipment operators, 
that r owned the property upon purchasing the property from Smith County at the resale 
auction. They were also told that no redemption lights existed under the laws of the state of 
Texas. 
18. On May 15, 2011, I placed a manufactured home on the property which I 
had purchased from Smith county at the same time I became the bona tide purchaser of the 
subject struck off real property. Attached hereto as exhibit "8" is a picture of this home 
formerly belonging to Clarence Williams. Attached hereto as exhibit M9" is Clarence WRliams 
property tax transcript. 
19. On May 15, 2011, Smith County called me twice presumably to inquire into 
the value of the manufactured home I placed on the property ; an assessed value they had 
already set under the Clarence Williams account. 
20. On June '1, 20i 1, I received an email from Lois Mosley, telling me that the 
original owners had redeemed the property and therefore Smith County was revoking the 
resale of the property to me_ I responded to Lois' email with threats of a lawsuit from the 
state of Idaho if Smith County did not tum over the Trustee's deed to me forthwith. Lois 
immediately contacted the County's other attorneys> Tab Beall and the Law Offices of 
Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins & Mott and informed them of.my threats of a lawsuit. On 
June 2, 2011, Tab Beall called my Idaho number 208-473-5800 and we discussed the basis 
of any future suit I might bring. Mr. Beall deceptively represented to .me that the county had 
the right to revoke any re-sale at any time up to the date the Trustee's Deed was recorded 
with the Smith County Clerk. I told Mr. Beall that he was wrong, I referred Mr. Beall to the 
Texas laws stating otherwise, and I informed Mr. Beall that if he didnt withdraw from the 
County's conspiracy to commit various racketeering violations, I would include Mr. Beall and 
his lawfirm in my lawsuit. Attached hereto as exhibit ~10" is my magic jack phone list bearing 
phone number 208-473-4800 and showing 2 incoming calls from Smith County on May 15, 
201 i and an incoming call from Tab Beall on June 2, 2011. I for any reason Smith County 
attorneys deny making this call to my Idaho number, then I seek discovery to prove this point 
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and a resultant default judgment for fraud upon tf'Je court 
21. Attached hereto as exhibit ~ii" are transaction records with tlie bank 
showing that $5450 was spent in demolition work on the subject real property. This does not 
include the $3500 fee to move the manufactured home to the properly, the cost of the home 
itself, or the costs to make repairs and utility hookups to the home. 
22. The US Supreme Court has long held that private citizens may sue foreign 
municipalities in their forum state for injuries caused to private citizens of .sister st.ates in re 
Chitcot County v. Sherwood, 148 US 529, 13 S.Ct 695, 37 LEd 546 (1893). This authority is 
attached hereto es exhibit "11 ". Accordingly, because !he defendants knew at all times that i 
' , 
haled from tile state of Idaho, that tlie contract at issue generated from me state of Idaho, 
•' 
that the monies funding this transaction were generating from an Idaho citizen, that i had 
expended substantial monetary sums improving the property based on the false promises of 
the County defendants, that 1 expected delivery of the Tmstee1s Deed to me in the state of 
Idaho, that the County defendants commited grand theft against me through extortion and 
illicit use of their offices when they announced that the resale of t!-ie properly was ret'G!cted 
based on the false premise that redemption had occurred, and when numerous other frauds 
were commited against me a!l the ·while I was here in the state of Idaho receiving those 
fraudulent communications and acts, the defendants may not claim that ti-sat this state lacks 
personal jurisdiction over them. 
You affianrsa'ith further naught; 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME TH1s2_ OF February, 2012 
~.hl=D YOC-
.. NotaryPubllc · 
-L.LlO-
Filed 
FEB 2 9 2012 
"\ ' -D ~Zhr~.,.v~ 
AT ,s.,q . O'Clock-r2--M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN Ai~D FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
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vs. ) MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
) 
SA1'<1DRA COPELA.t1\JD; AHMITRA ) 
MILLS; JEANETTE HARMON; CODY ) 
KELLY; PAUL KELLEY JR; THE ) 
THE ESTATE OF PAUL KELLEY SR; ) 
SMITH COUNTY TRUSTEE; TAX ) 
ASSESSOR GARY BARBER; SMITH ) 
COUNTY; ARTIE ROSS; ATTORNEY ) 
TAB BEALL; LAW OFFICES OF ) 
PURDUE, BRANDON, FIELDER, ) 
COLLINS & MOTT; LISA NtILSON, ) 




The above matter came before the Court on the 14th day of February, 2012. Plaintiff, Holli 
Telford, appeared pro se. Stephen L. Adams, of Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, appeared 
telephonically on behalf of the Defendants, Tab Beall; Law Offices of Purdue, Brandon, Fielder, 
Collins and Mott, LLP; Smith County; and Tax Assessor, Gary Barber. Sheila Fish performed as 
Court Reporter for said proceedings. 
At the onset, Holli Telford presented the Plaintiff's Motion To Reconsider the Court's 
foterlocutory Ruling To Dismiss Plaintiff's Claims Against The Smith County Defendants And For 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
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Rule 54(B) Certification. Stephen L. Adams, counsel for the Defendants, gave argument to said 
Motion citing no jurisdiction. Plaintiff, Holli Telford, gave rebuttal. 
The Court then ruled that the Court has no jurisdiction over any claims in this case and denied 
the Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider. Thereafter Plaintiff filed certain objections to the Court's 
rulings and the Court determined to separately file a \Vritten decision on the issues raised in the 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
Counsel for the Defendants was directed to prepare a Judgment and submit it for the Court's 
consideration. 
Plaintiff also stipulated that no further effort would be made to serve the remaining unserved 
Defendants in this case and requested that any dismissal of said Defendants be without prejudice. 
The Court's consideration of this stipulation and request \Vill be determined in the Court's written 
decision on the Motion for Reconsideration. Judgments, if any, will be filed separately, in 
accordance with LR.C.P. 54(a). 
IT IS ORDERED 
DATED this zq day of February, 2012. 
MINLJTE ENTRY A.t~"'D ORDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of March, 2012, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing MINLJTE ENTRY AND ORDER to the following person(s) in the 
manner indicated below: 
Stephen L. Adams 
At~ERSON, J1JL1AN & HULL LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Holli Telford 
10621 South Old Hwy 191 
Malad, ID 83252 
MThlJTE ENTRY M"D ORDER 
Holli Telford vs. Sandra Copeland, et al, CV-2011-66 
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[x] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[x] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
- 413 ... 
Filed 
FEB 2 9 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN MTD FOR THE COUNTY OF 01\TEIDA 
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SANDRA COPELM'D; AD MITRA MILLS ) 
JEANETTE HARMON; CODY KELLY; ) 
PAUL KELLEY JR.; THE ESTATE OF PAUL ) 
KELLEY SR.; SMITH COUNTY TRUSTEE; ) 
TAX ASSESSOR GARY BARBER; SMITH ) 
COUNTY; ARTIE ROSS; ATTORNEY TAB ) 
BEALL; LAW OFFICES OF PERDUE ) 
BRANDON, FIELDER, COLLINS & MOTT; LISA ) 
l\TEILSON, AND DOES 1 - 10, ) 
) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Re: SMITH COUNTY TEXAS; 
SMITH COUNTY TAX ASSESSOR 
GARY BARBER; ATTOR.~'EY TAB 
BEALL; LAW OFFICES OF 
PERDUE BRA~DON, FIELDER, 
COLLINS & MOTT 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's (Telford or Plaintiff) Motion for 
Reconsideration (Motion) of the Court's prior decision granting some appearing Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing this claim as to those Defendants for lack of 
jurisdiction.1 A hearing on the Motion was held February 14, 2012. The Defendants were 
represented telephonically by their counsel Stephen L. Adams. Ms. Telford appeared pro se. After 
careful re-consideration of the record, briefs, affidavits, and arguments of the parties the Court 
armounced its decision to DENY Plaintiff's Motion at the conclusion of the hearing. To make clear 
1 See Memorandum Decision filed October 3, 2011. 
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the Court's oral ruling it now issues this supplemental decision more formally outlining its ruling 
regarding why the tort prong of Idaho's Long ~"'ID Statute does not allow it to exercise jurisdiction 
over the Defendants. The sole issue to be supplemented is whether or not the tort prong of the 
long-arm statute would allow this court to exercise jurisdiction over the Defendants. However, 
before analyzing this issue, the Court makes the following comments. 
Following the hearing of February 14, 2012, and without leave of the Court, Plaintiff 
filed a document titled "Plaintiffs Objections ... " listing a number of objections to the Court's 
rulings at the hearing. Plaintiff first objected to allowing "Opposing Counsel Preparing The 
Memorandum Decision .... " No such decision was made by the Court. Defense counsel was 
directed to prepare a Judgment, a routine practice. Appropriate Judgments, approved by the 
Court, will be filed in this case as more fully outlined in this decision and the Judgments 
themselves. Plaintiff's objection is overruled. 
Plaintiff also objected to the "Court's Interpretation Of What Constitutes a Tort As 
Applied To the Claims Raised in Plaintiff's Original Pleading And Additional Issues Or Claims 
Tried By Consent .... " Plaintiff asserts that her Complaint raises tort claims or that tort claims 
were "tried by consent." Sin.ce the Court's ruling in this case is based on the pleadings, factually 
supplemented by affidavits, there are no issues that can be "tried by consent." They have either 
been alleged in the Complaint or they have not. A review of Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, filed 
June 3, 2011, identifies four causes of action, designated as: 1) Specific Performance on Bid 
Purchase Contract; 2) Breach of Contract And Of the Covenant Of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 
3) Breach of Idaho Consumer Sales Practices Act;2 and 4) Violation of Utah's Fraudulent 
Communications Act. Clearly, the first two causes of action raise contract claims and have been 
2 Although there is no statutory reference in the Complaint, Plaintiff has later made reference to the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act, LC. § 48-601 et seq., and the Court considers Plaintiff's claims under that statute. 
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addressed very specifically in the Court's earlier decision. The Court has been unable to find a 
determination by Idaho courts as to whether the third cause of action, i.e., breach of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act, is or is not a tort cause of action. It clearly is not a common law tort, 
but creates a statutory cause of action with its ovm set of elements and requirements. The same 
is true of the fourth cause of action. That claim, an alleged breach of the Utah Fraudulent 
Communications Act, has since been referenced by Plaintiff as a violation of the Idaho 
Racketeering Act, ostensibly LC. § 18-7805. No amended Complaint asserting such a claim has 
been filed in this case and the Court is required to analyze this matter on the claims asserted. 
Nevertheless, and although the Court has expressed some skepticism as to whether Plaintiff has 
asserted any tort claims in this case, out of an abundance of caution this matter will be analyzed 
under the tort prong of the Idaho long-arm statute. 
Plaintiff objects to an alleged limitation on the consideration of evidence in this case, 
claiming that the Court refused to consider filings after October 2011 and also asserting that 
Defendants "conspired to and did successfully steal plaintiff's building and construction 
equipment from the property according to a neighbor living by the property." These allegations 
are unintelligible and unsupported by any record. Plaintiff has made several filings in this case 
after October 2011 up to and including a "Notice of Filing Re-Notarized Affidavit ... " filed 
February 8, 2012. All of Plaintiff's submissions have been considered by the Court. Plaintiff 
has failed to identify any issues that have been consented to by the parties in addition to those 
raised in the Complaint, so any such objection is overruled. 
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the Court "improperly advocated a waived defense," i.e., 
whether the web site of Smith County where the property in question was advertised for sale was 
"active" or "passive." Plaintiff claims that Defendants did not raise this issue in their pleadings 
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so the matter was waived. Plaintiff misunderstands the Court's view. The issue of the nature of 
Smith County's web site is a factor raised by various affidavits in the case and is relevant to the 
question of the Court's jurisdiction over these Defendants. Smith County specifically contended 
that its advertisement of the property for sale is insufficient, by itself, to subject the county to this 
Court's jurisdiction.3 This raises the question of the nature of the web advertisement and the 
Court's characterization of it as "active" or "passive." Plaintiffs objection on this issue is also 
overruled. 
ANALYSIS 
I. The tort prong of the Long Arm Statute does not allow this Court to exercise 
jurisdiction over the Defendants. 
Prior to exercising jurisdiction over nonresident defendants Idaho courts must satisfy two 
criteria.4 First, the court must determine that the nonresident defendant's actions fall within the 
scope of Idaho's Long-Arm Statute.5 Second, the court must determine that exercising 
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant complies with the constitutional standards of due 
process.6 
A. May this Court exercise its jurisdiction over the nonresident Defendants under the 
tort prong of Idaho's Long-Arm Statute? 
Idaho's Long-Arm Statute extends jurisdiction over "[a]ny person, firm, company, 
association or corporation, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or 
through an agent ... comrni[its] a tortious act within this state."7 The phrase "within this state" 
3 Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, filed July 13, 2011, p. 11. 
~ McAnallyv. Bonjac, Inc., 137 Idaho 488, 491, 50 P.3d 983, 986 (2002); St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr. v. State of 
Washington, 123 Idaho 739, 742, 852 P.2d 491, 494 (1993). 
5 McAnally, 137 Idaho at 491, 50 P.3d 983. 
6 Id. 
7 LC.§ 5-514(b). 
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requires that the tortious injury occur in Idaho. 8 Further, this section is designed to provide a 
forum for Idaho residents, is remedial legislation of the most fundamental nature and should be 
liberally construed.9 
The cases of Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC and Akichika v. Kelleher are helpful in 
determining what constitutes the commission of a tortious injury within the state, as applied to 
the facts of this case. Akichika involved an Idaho resident who bought a truck from an Oregon 
resident. The buyer brought suit for damages in Idaho claiming that the seller had 
misrepresented the truck. 10 Although the buyer learned about the truck in Idaho and conversed 
by telephone from Idaho with the Oregon seller, the buyer traveled to Oregon to inspect the 
truck, purchased and took delivery of it there, and only learned of the problems allegedly 
constituting the fraud when it broke down in Oregon on the way back to Idaho. 11 The Idaho 
Supreme Court held that jurisdiction did not exist under either I.C. § 5-514(a), since the seller 
was not transacting business in the State of Idaho, or LC. § 5-514(b), because the alleged 
tortious act did not occur in Idaho. 12 The rationale of the Supreme Court was fairly 
straightforward. Until the Idaho resident traveled to Oregon and purchased the truck the tort of 
fraud had not been committed and he had no cause of action. The cause of action arose at the 
time of the purchase in Oregon. Therefore, even though the fraud was not discovered until later, 
because the cause of action arose at the time of the purchase the tort did not occur within Idaho 
and its courts could not exercise jurisdiction over the Oregon resident. 
Blimka involved an Idaho resident who bought jeans from an out of state wholesaler. The 
8 See, e.g., St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr. v. State of Washington, 123 Idaho 739, 743, 852 P.2d 491, 495 (1993); 
Duignan v. A.H Robins Co., 98 Idaho 134, 137, 559 P.2d 750, 753 (1977); Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of Am., 93 
Idaho 26, 454 P.2d 63 (1969). 
9 Doggett, 93 Idaho at 30, 454 P.2d at 67. 
10 Akichika v. Kelleher, 96 Idaho 930, 931, 539 P.2d 283, 284 (1975). 
11 Id. at 932, 539 P.2d at 285. 
12 Id. at 933, 539 P.2d at 286. 
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buyer learned of the jeans through an internet contact with the defendants and discussed the 
attributes of the jeans through means of email and telephone contacts. 13 The buyer alleged that 
the defendants directed misrepresentations to him in Idaho via electronic means and that he 
sustained injury when he took delivery of the jeans in Idaho, only then learning that they had 
been misrepresented. 14 This case differs from Akickika because the Idaho resident took delivery 
of the jeans in Idaho. Taking possession of the jeans within the state allowed the injury to be felt 
within the state and allowed Idaho courts to exercise jurisdiction under the tort prong of the long-
arm statute. 
Here, Telford also learned of an opportunity to purchase real property in Texas through 
an internet advertisement. She was able to download documents from the website that would 
allow her to bid on property. However, she could not purchase the property directly from the 
website. Because she could not purchase the property directly from the website it was a passive 
website. 
After Telford sent the necessary documentation to Smith County in Texas she was 
allowed to bid on the properties for sale. She was later declared the winning bidder on a piece of 
property she bid on. Smith County called her in Idaho multiple times to inform her she was the 
winning bidder and to discuss how to finalize the sale. At no time was the property ever 
transferred to Idaho because it was real property. Telford was not aware of any alleged 
violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, the Idaho Racketeering Act, or fraud unless 
and until she or an authorized agent took possession of the property in Texas. Just like in 
Akichika, because any causes of action would arise upon taking possession of the land in Texas 
the injury would be felt in Texas and not within Idaho. If the property purchased had not been 
13 Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 727, 152 P.3d 594, 598 (2007). 
14 Id. at 727, 152 P.3d at 598. 
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real property, but had been portable and Telford had taken possession of the property in Idaho 
like the purchaser in Blimka then the tort prong of the Idaho Long-Arm Statute may have 
allowed this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the Defendants, if a legitimate tort claim were 
alleged. However, real property is not portable. Under these circumstances the injury could only 
be felt in Texas as illustrated in Akichika. Plaintiffs assertions of the financial harm she 
experienced in Idaho do not change the result An Idaho resident will always feel a financial 
injury where that resident lives. If that were a legitimate basis, by itself, for exercising 
jurisdiction, then jurisdiction would always be found in Idaho when an Idaho resident claims 
financial injury. That would have been the case in Akichika. It is insufficient, by itself, to find 
jurisdiction here. 
The Court concludes that the tort prong of the Idaho Long Arm Statute does not empower 
this Court with jurisdiction over the Defendants. 
B. May this Court exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident Defendants in compliance 
with the United States Constitution's Due Process requirements? 
Even if the tort prong of the long-arm statute was applicable, allowing Idaho courts to 
exercise jurisdiction over the Defendants, their contacts with Idaho would still be insufficient 
under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution to permit jurisdiction. The Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution permits a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant when that defendant has certain minimum contacts with the state such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice."15 The court focuses on "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the 
litigation."16 If the "defendant's conduct and connection \Vith the forum state" is such that the 
defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there" then jurisdiction in that 
15 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L Ed. 95, 101-02 (1945). 
16 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 US. 186, 204, 97 S. Ct 2569, 2579 (1977). 
Case No. CV-2011-0000066 
:MEMORANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
- i.J?I) -
Page 7 
state will not violate the notion of fair play and justice. 17 This reasonable anticipation of being 
haled into court provides the nonresident a fair warning that they may be sued in that foreign 
jurisdiction. 
This reasonable anticipation is presumed to exist when a nonresident purposefully targets 
Idaho or Idaho's residents with their actions and these actions result in alleged injuries that "arise 
out of or relate to" those actions. 18 A targeted approach, where the actions are aimed at a target 
state, will lead to a strong relationship between the parties and the forum state. This strong 
relationship allows the forum state to exercise jurisdiction over the parties without offending the 
notions of fair play and justice. However, not all targeted contacts will be sufficient to provide 
jurisdiction. In Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Washington, the Idaho Supreme 
Court found that sending communications and payments to medical providers in Idaho was not 
sufficient to establish minimum contacts and any exercise of jurisdiction under these or similar 
. . 1 d d 19 Clfcurnstances v10 ate ue process. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a three part test to address whether 
jurisdiction can be exercised over nonresidents.20 Only compliance with all three parts will 
allow a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident. First, the nonresident defendant must 
"purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident 
thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of 
conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."21 
Second, the claim must be one which "arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum-related 
17 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct 559 (1980). 
18 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984). 
19 Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Medical Ctr. v. Wash., 123 Idaho 739, 744-45 (1993). 
20 Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (2008). 
21 Id 
Case No. CV-2011-0000066 
1'1EMORANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Page 8 
activities."22 Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction must "comport with fair play and substantial 
justice, i.e., it must be reasonable."23 
Under either the Idaho Supreme Court's analysis in Saint Alphonsus or the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals' test this Court finds that the Plaintiff has not established purposeful availment 
on the part of the Defendants. The initial untargeted actions of the Defendants are insufficient to 
allow an Idaho court to exercise jurisdiction. The actions of the Defendants only targeted the 
Plaintiff and Idaho after she had initiated the transaction in Texas. The minimal contacts 
between the Plaintiff and Defendants arose incidentally from the transaction to sell property in 
Texas. The Plaintiff traveled to Texas, negotiated for the sale of the property by sending 
documents to Smith County in Texas, ru'ld could only take possession of the property in Texas. 
The phone calls and emails from the Defendants to the Plaintiff are incidental to the transaction 
and are insufficient to forewarn the Defendants that they could be haled into an Idaho court. 
Even though Idaho has an inclusive long-arm statute intended to protect its residents by 
exercising jurisdiction over nomesident parties it is not without limits. The Defendants' actions 
must fall within the scope of the long-arm statute and the exercise of jurisdiction must not violate 
due process. Because the Defendants' actions do not fall within the scope of Idaho's Long-Arm 
Statute it would violate due process for an Idaho court to exercise jurisdiction over them. 
Because this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case it must be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff, in her submissions after the Court's decision filed October 3, 2011, does not 
assert any facts which changes the Court analysis of its jurisdiction over the claims made against 
the appearing Defendants in this case. The Court's prior decision stands. In addition, any 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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alleged tortious injury Telford suffered would have arisen out of and been felt in Texas. Because 
the injury was not felt within Idaho the tort prong of the long-arm statute cannot be used to allow 
this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the Defendants. The Defendants' incidental contacts with 
Idaho, arising from the business transacted in Texas, are an insufficient basis to establish 
jurisdiction under Idaho's Long-Arm Statute. Furthermore, even if the long-arm statute were 
applicable the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution would prohibit jurisdiction 
in Idaho because the Defendants have not purposefully availed themselves to the jurisdiction of 
Idaho or had sufficient contact with Idaho to reasonably anticipate being haled into an Idaho 
court. Because the Defendants have not submitted to jurisdiction in Idaho through any other 
means this Court lacks jurisdiction. Therefore, the Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants are 
DISMISSED, with prejudice. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 
Finally, the question remains as to Defendants who have not specially appeared in this 
matter but who, pursuant to the Court's Order filed July 18, 2011, have not been properly served. 
\\'hen this issue was presented at the hearing of February 14, 2012 Plaintiff stipulated that no 
further effort would be made to serve all remaining, unserved, Defendants, and requesting that 
any dismissal of those Defendants be without prejudice, Plaintiff preserving the right to appeal 
said dismissal on the grounds that the Court erred in refusing to enter default judgment against 
said Defendants for failure to effect proper service. Therefore, pursuant to the Court's authority 
granted by LR. C.P. 41 (b ), Plaintiff's Complaint against all remaiPing unserved and non-
appearing Defendants is DISMISSED, without prejudice. 
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DATED this zq day of February, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st: day of Ma.rt'.M , 2012, I served a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing Memorandum Decision to the following person( s) in the 
manner indicated below: 
Holli Telford 
10621 S. Old Hwy. 191 
Malad, ID 83252 
Stephen L. Adams 
ANDERSON, JULIA.N & HULL LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
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vs. ) JUDGMENT 
) 
SANDRA COPELMTD; ADMITRA ) 
MILLS; JEANETTE HARMON; CODY ) 
KELLY; PAUL KELLEY JR; THE ) 
THE ESTATE OF PAlJL KELLEY SR; ) 
SMITH COlJNTY TRUSTEE; TAX ) 
ASSESSOR GARY BARBER; SMITH ) 
COUNTY; ARTIE ROSS; ATTORNEY ) 
TAB BEALL; LAW OFFICES OF ) 
PlJRDUE, BRANDON, FIELDER, ) 
COLLINS & MOTT; LISA NEILSON, ) 
AND DOES 1 - 10, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Pursuant to a Memorandum Decision and Order dated the 3rd day of October, 2011, 
confirmed by an oral order denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the same, entered 
February 14, 2012, and further confirmed by a Memorandum Decision denying Plaintiff's Motion 
for Reconsideration filed February zq, 2012, this Court has granted Summary Judgment in favor of 
JUDGMENT 
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M. 
of the Defendants, Tab Beall; Law Offices of Purdue, Brandon, Fielder, Collins and Mott, LLP; 
Smith County; and Tax Assessor, Gary Barber, said case being DISMISSED, with prejudice. 
Furthermore, pursuant to the Court's Memorandum Decision filed February ;2/j , 2012, this 
Court determined, pursuant to LR.C.P. 4l(b), that this matter should be DISMISSED against the 
remaining, unserved, Defendants, Sandra Copeland; Admitra Mills; Jeanette Harmon; Cody Kelley; 
Paul Kelley, Jr.; the Estate of Paul Kelley, Sr.; Smith County Trustee; Artie Ross; and Lisa Nielson, 
without prejudice. 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and for the reasons previously set forth, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED A_,_~ DECREED that judgment be entered in this 
matter in favor of all Defendants, and against Plaintiff, and said case is hereby DISMISSED, both 
with prejudice as to some Defendants and without prejudice as to other Defendants, as set forth 
above. This is a final dismissal as to all Defendants and is a final judgment, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
54(a). 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of March, 2012, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER to the following person(s) in the 
manner indicated below: 
Stephen L. Adams 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Holli Telford 
10621 South Old Hv.y 191 
Malad, ID 83252 
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SANDRA COPELAND, et al. 
Defendant 
Case No. 2011 -CV -66 
MOTIONS TO: (1) VACATE FILING 
DATE OF FEBRUARY29, 2012 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND FINAL 
JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE ABOVE 
STATED CASE ON THE GROUNDS 
THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT SERVED 
A COPY OF THESE RULINGS, 
(2) RE FILE THESE DOCUMENTS 
INTO THE DOCKET WITH A NEW 
FILING DATE SO THAT PLAINTIFF IS 
NOT PREJUDICED FROM OBJECTING 
TO ANY MATTER IN THESE RULINGS 
UPON RECEIVING NOTICE OF THEM 
AND 
(3) ORDER THAT ALL PROCESS BE 
SERVED UPON PLAINTIFF 
ELECTRONICALLY DUE TO PERJURED 
SERVICE CERTIFICATES BY ONEIDA 
COUNTY CLERK DIANE SKIDMORE 
COMES NOW plaintiff Holli Telford and moves this court (1) to vacate the 
filing date of the February 29, 2012 Memorandum Decision and Final Judgment entered in 
the above stated case on the grounds that Plaintiff was not served a copy of these 
rulings , (2) to re-file these doduments into the docket with a new filing date so that 
plaintiff is not prejudiced from objecting to any matter in these rulings upon receiving 
notice of them, and (3) order that all process be served upon plaintiff electronically due 
l. 
- Lf2~ -
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to perjured service certificates by Oneida County clerk Diane Skidmore, or that the clerk 
for Judge Dunn in Power county be ordered to serve Plaintiff all of her process. 
On February 14, 2012, Plaintiff submitted an ex parte application to this court 
to remove Oneida County clerks Diane Skidmore and Regina Coburn from sitting on any 
and all actions concerning Plaintiff due to tampering with court records, failing to file 
court process submitted by Plaintiff, and failing to serve Plaintiff notice of any proceedings 
before this court. 
On March 14, 2012, this court conducted a hearing in an unrelated Oneida 
case involving plaintiff's suit against Oneida County officials, case no. 2011-CV-107 .. 
Plaintiff was not given notice of that hearing nor any rulings issued by the court in prospect 
of that hearing. Consequently plaintiff was not at the hearing when it was due to 
commence. This court directed the clerk to call plaintiff to inquire into her failed 
appearance. The clerk did so and plaintiff immediately drove down to the court to object 
to the hearing. 
After plaintiff arrived, plaintiff vigorously complai.ned that she did not receive any 
' . . 
notice of the hearing date, that she had not received any process by the court reference 
the March 13, 2012 hearing or any other matter, and that clerk Diane Skidmore once 
again perjured herself on the ceritifcates of service re the court's process .. 
Plaintiff then redirected the court to her February 14, 2012 ex pa rte application 
to disqualify clerks Diane Skidmore and Regina Coburn from administering over any case 
involving Plaintiff, and re-asserted that she had attached to this ex parte motion, CD's 
showing how Oneida County derks Diane Skidmore and Regina Coburn had criminally 
altered Plaintiffs criminal dockets and back filed documents to Plaintiff's substantial 
prejudice, how these clerks had altered court records to sustain bogus criminal charges 
against Plaintiff, how clerk Skidmore had filed a perjured affidavit to the Idaho Supreme 
Court resulting in the corrupt dismissal of Plaintiffs appeal in her first lawsuit agianst 
Oneida County, and how clerk Skidmore had intentionally and corruptly concealed over 
13 filings submitted by plaintiff re the vexatious litigant proceedings to exact a corrupt pre-
filing order against Plaintiff. Plaintiff also announced that she had submitted her 
complaints not only to the Idaho Supreme Court and the Attorney General's office, but 
she had also submitted these cornplarnts to various congressional committee members 
requesting an investigation and protective legislation against such official abuse. 
-t-1.?.:'1 -
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This court gave the prosecutor until March 28, 2012 to respond to Plaintiff's 
criminal allegations against the clerks of the Oneida County court. PLAINTIFF FULLY 
EXPECTS THE PROSECUTOR TO VIOLATE HIS DUTY OF OFFICE AND IGNORE 
THESE CHARGES BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR WAS DIRECTLY INVOLVED !N 
ORDERING THE CLERKS TO BACK THE FILINGS DATES ON THE PROBABLE 
CAUSE DEPOSITION AFFIDAVIT OF SHERIFF JEFF SEMRAD AND THE PROPERTY 
INVENTORY LIST IN RE CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2011-CR-719 BY THREE MONTHS. 
Because of the claimed notice defects, this court ordered the parties to appear 
on paper to the matters intended for hearing on March 14, 2012 and ordered plaintiff to 
respond to the court's jurisdictional concerns regarding the merging of a complaint with a 
de novo proceeding by March 21, 2012, The court indicated that it would consider 
reinstating it's prior order that plaintif could file all process electronically and receive all 
notice eletronically - to deflect against self serving and perjurious service certificates that 
fraudlently claimed notice was given to Plaintiff or that plaintiff did not tender certain 
documents for filing. 
After this hearing, Plaintiff returned to her home and later that evening pulled up 
the Idaho Supreme Court's repository website to see if there was any other process that 
this court had issued and for which clerk Skidmore failed to serve upon Plaintiff. Plaintiff 
first learned of the court's February 29, 2012 entry of an alleged decision and final 
judgment in this matter late last night. Plaintiff has not received service of any of this 
court process by the clerk Dian Skidmore, irregardless of any certificate stating otherwise. 
Becaue Plaintiff is unaware of the text in these docuemtns, she cannot 
formulate any objection thereo, if any is needed. This prejudices plaintiffs right to enter 
the required objection at the trial level within the 14 day period requied uner rule 59. 
Accordingly, plaintiff reasserts her request that Diane Skidmore be removed 
from administering over any of Plaintiffs cases, that this court issue an order that plantiff is 
required to be served all process from this court electronically, that this court either place 
his clerk in power county or Oneida County clerk Janet Deuchamps, (the only clerk who 
has not engaged in corrupt actions to plaintiff's knowledge) over plaintiff's cases, that this 
court vacate the filing date of February 29, 2012 on all process entered into the docket on 
that date , and refile these documents anew, that after re-entry of these documents, this 
court order either a power county clerk or Oneida County clerk Janet Deuchamps to serve 
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plaintiff these documents electroncally, and that this court acknowledge that plaintiff has 
14 days from re-entry of the process in which to o · 
Date: March 14, 2012 
Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to the following 
parties on March 15, 2012/ 
Brian Julian, Stephen Adams 
250 South Fifth Street Ste 700 
PO Box 7426 
Boise Idaho 83707 
Fax no. 208-344-551 o 
Judge Dunn Facsimile: (208) 236-7208 
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MEMORA1'1DUM DECISION ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO VACATE 
JUDGMENT FILING DATE 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate the filing date of the 
Judgment in this matter, Plaintiff claiming that she did not become aware of the Judgment until the 
evening of March 13, 2012, despite certification on the Judgment by the Clerk of the Court that it 
was mailed to the Plaintiff on February 29, 2012. No response to Plaintiff's Motion has been 
received from the Defendants, and because of the time sensitive nature of the issue, the Court issues 
Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Filing Date 
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this ruling at this time. The Court notes that the Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Reconsideration and the Judgment was e-mailed to Plaintiff on March 15, 2012 at 12:59 p.m. as a 
copy of that e-mail was also provided to the Court. 
Addressing the pressing issue, the Court is unconvinced that the Clerk did not mail a copy of 
the Memorandum Decision and Judgment to the Plaintiff on February 29, 2012. There is no 
evidence of this failure other than Plaintiffs statement to that effect. 
In addition, Plaintiffs purported reason for needing additional time is to file a Motion under 
I.R.C.P. 59 within 14 days of the Judgment. However, this rule applies to motions for new trial, is 
not applicable here and is not available to the Plaintiff. Therefore, the 14 day concern is not valid. 
The Court originally issued a Memorandum Decision and Order, granting Defendants 
Motion for Summary Judgment, on October 3, 2011, and orally denied Plaintiffs Motion for 
Reconsideration of the same on February 14, 2012, confirmed by a Memorandum Decision filed 
February 29, 2012, which Plaintiff claims she did not aware of until March 13, 2012 and which she 
most certainly received by e-mail on March 15, 2012. In short, this Court has carefully considered 
and then reconsidered the issues presented in this case. Plaintiff was aware of the decision of the 
Court on February 14, 2012. 
The Plaintiff is still well 1vithin the time limit for filing an appeal of the Judgment in this 
case and is not prejudiced in that regard. Should the Plaintiff have some good faith basis, both 
factually and by rule, for seeking further review of the Court's Judgment and the Decision denying 
her Motion for Reconsideration this will be allowed within 14 days of March 15, 2012. \\'hether 
any such motion would extend the appeal time, pursuant to I.A.R. 14(a) is a matter than cannot be 
Order on PlaintifPs Motion to Vacate Filing Date 
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determined at this time and the Court will not presume to rule on it. However, the Motion to Vacate 
the Filing Date of the Judgment, or February 29, 2012, is DENIED and, in the absence of a proper 
motion which complies with I.AR. 14(a), the appeal time will run within 42 days of the date the 
Judgment was filed, i.e., February 29, 2012. 
Plaintiff also asks that this Court disqualify District Court clerks Diane Skidmore and 
Regina Coburn from participating in any case involving the Plaintiff in Oneida County, including 
this one. The Court has entered a decision on this same issue in Oneida County Case No. CV -2011-
107, which decision in incorporated herein by reference, and for the reasons set forth in that 
decision, the Motion to Disqualify the clerks is DENIED. 
Plaintiff also asks this Court to require that all decisions of the Court be e-mailed to 
Plaintiff. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. S(b) service of Court documents can be made by mail or 
electronically. The Court finds no basis for concluding that the clerks of Oneida County have not 
performed their duties appropriately as concerning the Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the Court directs the 
clerk, in this proceeding, to both mail and e-mail service of court documents on the Plaintiff, 
including this ORDER, and to copy any such e-mail to the Court at chambers in Bannock County. 
IT IS SO ORDERED . 
..,., 
DATED this 21"'" day of March, 2012. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
,).,, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22!' Clay of March, 2012, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing ORDER to the following person(s) in the manner indicated below: 
Stephen L. Adams 
Ac"l\JDERSON, JULIA~ & HULL LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Holli Telford 
10621 South Old Hwy 191 
Malad, ID 83252 
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[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
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[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
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[x] E-mail 
Deputy Clerk / 0 
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10621 S. Old Hwy 191 
Malad City, Idaho 83252 
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SANDRA COPELAND, et al. 
Defendant 
State of Utah 
County of Box Elder 
Case No. 2011 -CV -66 
Affidavit Of Holli Telford 
Asserting Numerous Errors 
In· The Court's February 29, 2012 
Judgment And Moving for Relief 
From That Judgment Pursuant To 
l.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(6) 
I, Holli Telford, sworn and under oath, deposes and says: 
Filed 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein and do competently 
attest thereto. 
2. I did not receive this court's order in the mail after entry sometime on 
February 29, 2012. I have repeatedly complained about not receiving my mail. The 
Idaho Supreme Court serves my mail by certified return receipt to ensure delivery to me. 
This court has now entered another order pursuant to rule 5(b) that ensures electronic 
delivery to me. This Order was entered on March 21, 2012. 
3. Nevertheless, while this court has denied my motion to re-file the 
judgment for a new date, the court has given me until March 29, 2012 to file a motion to 
reconsider this court's finar judgment, albiet not extending the period for me to file a 
FROM : FAX NO. Mar. 27 2012 05:14PM P3 
notice of appeal. 
4. I do not believe that this court has jurisdiction to consider a motion for 
reconsideration of the final judgment because the 14 day limitations period has passed to 
file a motion to reconsider the final judgment and this limitations period is not 
discretionary with the court. 
5. Therefore l will move for relief from the final judgment under rule 60(b)(6) 
and simultaneously file a request that a hearing be conducted on the written pleadings 
within 14 days as I will be in jury proceedings on criminal matters and will not be available 
to appear personally before this court. 
6. I make the following due process objections to this court. 
7. Before and during the February 14, 2012 hearing, this court advised the 
parties that it would not take any additional evidence going to the claims made in this 
action that were not submitted to this court before November 21, 2011 1 ; the latter date 
when I was arrested on new criminal charges regarding notarial functions with this court's 
clerk Diane Skidmore and having a serious obstruction impact on this case.This court 
clearly stated that it would not accept any more wiltten affidavits in this case. 
8. In open court on February 14, 2012, I again complained that I needed to 
amend the complaint to include newly accrued RICO claims. I argued that the 
defendants had engaged in other racketeering acts which included bringing about the 
above stated criminal proceedings agianst me in re State of Idaho v. Lundahl 2011-CR-
958 for the purpose of extorting me out of my rightful claims herein. 2 I also informed the 
1. I did file another notarized affidavit to replace the July 18, 2011 affidavit of 
record in this court - because the Oneida County sheriff altered my July 18, 2011 
affidavit by cutting up my original document and reconstructing another affidavit with 
adhesive tape ....: in order to charge me with forging Diane Skidmore's notary onto my 
affidavit and thereby successfully obstructing this lawsuit in favor of the defendants. 
2. See l.C. 18-2403. Theft. (i} A person steals property and commits theft 
when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to 
a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner 
thereof. 
(e) By extortion. A person obtains property by extortion when he 
compels or induces another person to deliver such property to 
himself or to a third person by means of instilling in him a fear 
that, lf the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: 
J-' 
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court on the record that I just learned that the Defendants had stolen mine and Ferron 
Stokes manufactured home on the property, all of our construction equipment and our 
heavy duty dump trailer- based on opposing counsel's proclamation to the remainder 
parties that Oneida County was prosecuting me for 14 felony counts and that I would 
therefore not be able to prosecute my claims herein due to likely incarceration in jail . 3 
9. This court stated in open court that it would not hear these new allegations, 
but under the dodrine of merger, this court was required to do so. 
10. This court also stated that because I did not plead my Idaho RICO claim in 
my complaint but instead pied a Utah RICO claim, that I could not amend this error. 
I contend that this is a mistatement of law because l argued in my affidavit filed on July 18, 
2011 that I was pursuing an Idaho not Utah RICO claim and then I proceeded to argue 
my Idaho RICO claim with respect to jurisdiction in this forum. l.R.C.P. Rule 15(b) 
provides that claims not included in the pleadings may be argued by consent. 4 
i 1. It is undisputed that I argued an Idaho RICO claim back in July of 2011 
and that the new theft and extortion facts raised at the February 14, 2012 hearing 
2. Cause damage to property; or 
4. Accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal 
charges to be instituted against him; or 
3. See l.C. 18-2407 Grand Larceny (b) A person is guilty of grand theft 
when he commits a theft as defined in this chapter and when: 1. The value of the 
property taken exceeds one thousand dollars ($1,000); or 5. The property, regardless of 
its nature and value, is obtained by extortion. 
4. See Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 48 P.3d 1241 {Idaho 
2002) l.R.C.P. 15(b) provides: Amendments to conform to the evidence. 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent 
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in 
the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to 
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be 
made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so 
to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. 
Furthermore, Thomas supra decisioned that claims not raised in the pleadings may be 
argued in motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Same in Consolidated AG of 
Curry, Inc. v. Rangen, Inc., 128 Idaho 228, 912 P.2d 115 (Idaho 1996) (The trial court 
properly concluded that "the issues that would allow plaintiff to recover against IFA directly 
were tried by 'implied consent' of IFA, prior to the dismissal of !FA by Rangen.") 
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raised additional predicate RICO acts consummated in the state of Idaho 5 and showed 
continuous racketeering activity. 6 In addition, I alleged that all defendants associated 
in fact for the common purpose of engaging in the predicate acts complained of by me 
with the ultimate goal of accherving an illegal objective, and thus I established the 
existence of an enterprise within the meaning of U.S. v. Turkette, 452 U.S'. 576, 583 
(1981). In addition there is no question I alleged a pattern of racketeering. For example, 
my affidavit filed on July 18, 2011 charged the defendants with making repeated false 
promises to me that the defendants will in the future engage in particular conduct, when 
the defendants in fact did not intend to engage in such conduct - in order to extort a 
greater value out of the sold properties at mine and Ferron Stoke's expense. 7 
5. Personal Jurisdiction under criminal law is the loci where one element of a 
crime is completed. See Idaho v. Doyle, 828 P.2d 1316; 121Idaho911 (ID, 1992} 
(Such an interpretation is in harmony with the general rule that "the requisite elements of 
the completed crime may be committed in different jurisdictions, and in such cases any 
state in which an element of the crime is committed may take jurisdiction."[Footnote 4] 21 
Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law§ 345 at 598 {1981); accord Findley v. State, 307 Ark. 53, 818 
S.W>2d242(1991); Statev. Lane, i12Wash.2d464, 771P-2d1150(1989);Statev. 
Schaaf, 234 Neb. 144, 449 N.W.2d 762 (1989); State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 645 P.2d 
784 (1982)). Furthermore, the cMI racketeering act has the same rules imposed upon it 
as are imposed in the criminal forum, except the standard of poof is slightly lower under 
the civil form. See 18-7803. Definitions. As used in this chapter, (a) "Racketeering" 
means any act which is chargeable or indictable under the following sections of the Idaho 
Code or which are equivalent acts chargeable or indictable as equivalent crimes under the 
laws of any other jurisdiction: 
6. See l.C. § 18-7803(d). A single scheme may be sufficient to establish a 
pattern of racketeering if the plaintiff establishes "that the predicate acts themselves 
amount to, or constitute a threat of, continuing racketeering activity." Spence v. 
Howell, 126 ldaho 763, 775, 890 P.2d 714, 726 (1995). 
7. See l.C. 18-2403. Theft. (i) A person steals property and commits theft 
when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to 
a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner 
thereof. 
(d) By false promise: 
1. A person obtains property by false promise when pursuant to a 
scheme to defraud, he obtains property of another by means of a 
representation, express or implied, that he or a third person will in the future 
engage in particular conduct, and when he does not intend to engage in such 
conduct or, as the case may be, does not believe that the third person intends to 
engage in such conduct 
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12. It was therefore unfair for this court to restrict my affidavit, Ferron 
Stoke's affidavit and Michel Slicker's affidavits in support of the new RICO facts 
merging into this action. 
13. I attest that I was contacted on February 10, 2012 and informed that all 
of our personal properties had been stolen from the Flint Texas lot; specifically all but 
one item was removed from the flint property to an undisclosed location, and the 
remaining item was padlocked. I was advised via phone by Michel Slicker who the 
neighbor to this property. See concurrently filed affidavit of Michel Slicker. I called the 
constable in Texas to file a criminal complaint. The constable indicated that the matter 
was civil and that because I had lost this civil case, the Sandra Coleman relatives were 
entitled to possess everything on the property. In fact, Michel Slicker attests that he 
and L.A. Greer went over to the properties and talked to the Colemen, et al. defendants. 
These defendants informed Michel Slicker and LA Greer that mine and Ferron Stoke's 
items now belonged to the Coleman defendants because I had lost my suit and because I 
was going to be placed in jail for many, many years based on the criminal charges 
pending against me. 
14. These party admissions are telling because they establish my extortion 
claim actionable under RICO and which provides that theft by extortion occurs when a 
person obtains property ... by accusing someone of a crime. This last overt act 
conclusively places jurisdiction in the state of Idaho-- because I am presently defending 
against accusations that I forged a declaration and a verification in this instant action -- in 
the Idaho criminal court system. 8 
8. Idaho v. Doyle, 828 P.2d 1316; 121 Idaho 911 (ID, 1992) is the 
seminal in Idaho for determining personal jurisdiction over a crime. The facts and legal 
conclusion of that case are as follows: · 
On August 19, 1988, a complaint against Doyle was filed with the Ada County 
District Court for the crime of felony child custody interference and a warrant was 
issued for his arrest. Doyle was returned to Idaho for prosecution on the charge of 
felony child custody interference. He filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction. Doyle argued that because neither he nor Cindy nor Shawn were in 
Idaho when any act of withholding may have occurred, such act must have 
occurred in either the State of Oregon or the State of Washington. Therefore, 
under l.C. § 19-301, the State of Idaho was allegedly without jurisdiction to 
prosecute the action. The trial court denied Doyle's motion to dismiss, finding 
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footnote 8 continued 
that the state did have jurisdiction under LC. § 19-302 because the crime was 
consummated within Idaho. We first note our standard of review. Subject matter 
jurisdiction presents a question of law over which we exercise free review. 
Hanson v. State, 121 Idaho 507, 826 P.2d 468 (1992); Gage v. Harris, 119 Idaho 
451, 807 P.2d 1289 (Ct.App.1991). Reflecting this approach, l.C. § 18-202 sets 
forth Idaho's territorial jurisdiction as follows: Territorial jurisdiction over accused 
persons liable to punishment. -- The following persons are liable to punishment 
under the laws of this state: 
1. All persons who commit, in whole or in part, any crime within this state. 
This Court has stated that it must be inferred from the language of Subsection 1. 
of the above statute that "the legislature intended to punish any person 
who should commit any portion of a crime within this state to the 
same extent and in the same manner as though all of the acts which 
constitute the crime had been committed here." State v. Sheehan, 33 
Idaho 553, 561-62, 196 P. 532, 534 (1921). 
A further definition of an Idaho court's territorial jurisdiction can be found in 
LC. § 19-301. This statute was amended in 1986 to include the language that 
"[e]vidence that a prosecutable act was committed within the state of Idaho is a 
jurisdictional requisite, and proof of such must be shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Although the term '1prosecutable act" has not been defined by the 
legislature or this Court, it would appear that, to be consistent with l.C. § 18-202, 
"prosecutable act" means any essential element of the crime. 
A third statute, l.C. § 19-302, allows a defendant to be liable for punishment 
within Idaho "when the commission of an element of a public offense occuring 
within or without the state is consummated within this state's boundaries ... .'' 
States with statutes similar to l.C. § 19-302 have interpreted them to mean that 
jurisdiction will exist if the conduct performed outside the state caused a criminal 
result or effect within the state.[Footnote 31 See Wheat v. State, 734 P.2d 1007, 
1010 (Alaska Ct.App.1987) ("[T]he commission of a crime is consummated in 
Alaska when the crime is defined to require a result as a necessary element and 
when that result occurs inside the state."); 
Such an interpretation is in harmony with the general rule that "the requisite 
elements of the completed crime may be committed in different jurisdictions, and 
in such cases any state in which an essential part of the crime is committed may 
take jurisdiction."[Footnote 4] 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 345 at 598 (1981); 
accord Findley v. State, 307 Ark. 53, 818 S.W.2d 242 (1991); State v. Lane, 112 
Wash.2d 464, 771 P.2d 1150 (1989); State v. Schaaf, 234 Neb. 144, 449 N.W.2d 
762 (1989); State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 645 P.2d 784 (1982}. This general rule 
is also acknowledged in the Model Penal Code which states that a person can be 
prosecuted if "either the conduct which is an element of the offense or the result 
which is an element occurs within the State."Model Penal Code § 1.03(1)(a). 
Given this statutory structure, an Idaho court will have subject 
matter jurisdiction over a crime if any essential element of the crime, 
even a result, occurs within Idaho. Therefore, in this ca~e. we must 
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15. Which brings me to another error in this court's ruling. This court in it's 
February 29, 2012 order ruled that all of my claims are dismissed with prejudice on their 
merits as it applied to the appearing defendants. This court erroneously withheld that this 
court's dismissal with prejudice disposition was solely to the issue of "personal 
jurisdiction" over the appearing defendants. This court never reached the merits of any 
of my substantive claims. This court's judgment makes it appear as if this court did so. 
determine the essential elements of the crime of child custody interference as it is 
defined in LC. § 18-4506, and whether any such element occurred in Idaho. 
First, regarding the elements of child custody interference. The crime of child 
custody interference is defined in LC. § 18-4506(1) as: 
A person commits child custody interference if the person ... intentionally 
and without lawful authority: 
(a) Takes, entic:es away, keeps or withholds any minor child from a parent 
or another person or in\stitution having custody, joint custody, visitation or other 
parental rights, .... (El"ljlphasis added.) 
In this case, Doyle ldid not take or entice Shawn away from Cindy. However, 
he did keep or withhold custody of Shawn from Cindy in violation of the temporary 
custody agreement. Th~refore, under the facts of this case, we are involved with 
the crime of child custo~y interference as it is defined as an omission. Under the 
temporary custody agre~ment, Doyle had a duty to return custody of Shawn to 
Cindy on July 16, 198,8. His failure to return Shawn deprived Cindy of her 
custodial rights and exposed him to criminal prosecution under LC.§ 18-4506(1). 
Regarding the secc}nd element, the keeping or withholding, a comparison to 
the crime of nonsupport !is useful. Nonsupport is a crime of omission in which the 
state where the duty is r~quired to be performed has jurisdiction. 
W. LaFave & A. Scott at 185 (citing Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 70, 
comment a (1934)) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Because we find that 
the withholding of the child from the custodial parent in violation of a court order is 
no different than the wi~holding of support from a family in violation of a court 
order, we conclude th* the keeping or withholding occurs, for purposes of 
jurisdiction, where the 9efendant is required to return the child to the custodial 
~ra~ I . 
Not only did the w1ithholding occur within Idaho, but the result occurred in 
Idaho as well. See State v. Shaw, 96 Idaho 897, 539 P.2d 250 (1975). States 
which have addressed this issue have reached a similar Conclusion. Wheat v. 
State, 734 P.2d 1007, idiO (Alaska Ct.App.1987) ("[T]he commission of a crime is 
consummated in Alasd when the crime is defined to require a resutt as a 
necessary element and When that result occurs inside the state."); 
Accordingly, we cohclude that the second and third elements of the crime of 
child custody intetferende, the keeping or withholding and the deprivation of the 
custodial rights, occurre~ in Idaho. Therefore, under LC. §§ 18-202, i9-301 and 
19-302, the state had jurdiction over the crime, 
I ?, 
I - WU.?.-
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16. Given the foregoing, it was error for this court not to accept mine and 
others affidavits going to additional RICO acts that surefoot jurisdiction on this state, and 
which this court was required to· receive in fairly and accurately disposing it's claims. 
Your affiant saith n JJght, . _} 
v \_fvffi ~~-· 
HOLLI TELF®RD 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS ZZ DAY OF MARCH 2012. 
, NOT ARY PUBLIC 
Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to the following 
parties onyt,l.f....th 1--1 1 u.,v 
Brian Julian, Stephen Adams 
250 South Fifth Street Ste 700 
PO Box 7426 
Boise ldaho 83707 
Fax no. 208u344-5510 
Judge Dunn Facsimile: (208) 236-7208 
Oneida County clerk 208-766-2990 
FROM : 
Holli Lundahl 
10621 S. Old Hwy 19i 
Malad City, Idaho 83252 
208-766-5559 
FAX NO. 
BEFORE THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
HOLLI TELFORD 
Case No. 2011 -CV -66 
Plaintiff 
Affidavit Of Michel Slicker 
Supporting: · 
R 2 8 
v. Plaintiff's Attack On February 29, 2012 
Judgment And Moving for Relief 
From That Judgment Pursuant To 
l.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(6) 
SANDRA COPELAND, et al. 
Defendant 
State of Utah 
County of Box Elder 
I, Michel Slicker, sworn and under oath, declare as follows: 
1. I have knowledge of the facts set forth herein and do competently attest 
thereto. 
2. I am a resident of the state of Texas smith county. 
3. I live close to the Flint Texas property ·purchased by plaintiff from Smith 
County. 
4. .1 am acquainted with LA Greer. I noticed that the defaulted owners of . . . 
the property were removing plaintiff's construction equipment and trailer from the 
property. They also broke into plaintiff's home and began removing furnishngs and 
appliances. They also placed a pad lock on home. 
5. I went over the property with LA Greer and began asking the default 
owners what they were doing with Ms. Telford's. properties. The defaulted owners, 
M. 
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Sandra Coleman, and the Kelly family informed us that they had beat Ms. Telford in a 
lawsuit in Idaho, that they now owned Ms. Telford's properties, and that Ms. Telford was 
going to jail for a long tlme. We expressed disbelief and asked where they removed Ms. 
Telford's properties. They refused to tell us. 
6. We called the constable for Smith County who refused to do anything 
about it, claiming that his boss told him it was okay for the Coleman's and Kelleys to do 
what they wished with the properties. 
7. We immedlately contacted Holli and Ferron around the 1 Qth of February 
2012 to let them know about the thefts. Holli informed us that she would contact the 
appropriate authorites and let the court know what was going on. 
Your affiant saith naught, 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this rte ~ay of March, 2012 
Notary Pul?"lJc 
Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to the following 
parties on /.i~(ld_t;n 2012. 
Brian Julian, Stephen Adams 
250 South Fifth Street Ste 700 
PO Box 7426 
Boise Idaho 83 707 
Fax no. 208-344-5510 




10621 S. Old Hwy 191 
Malad City, Idaho 83252 
208~ 766-5559 
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SANDRA COPELAND, et al. 
Defendant 
State of Utah 
County of Box Elder 
Case No. 2011 -CV -66 
Affidavit Of Ferron Stakes 
Supporting: 
Plaintiff's Attack On February 29, 2012 
Judgment And Moving for Relief 
From That Judgment Pursuant To 
l.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(6) 
l, Ferron Stokes, sworn and under oath, declare as follows: 
1. I have knowledge of the facts set forth herein and do competently attest 
thereto. 
2. I am a resident of the state of Idaho. 
3. t purchased the note from America First Bank and the prior lien holder S. 
Durfee on the manufactured home which obligations were created to purchase the title 
on the subject property, to do improvements on the subject real property and to make 
infrastructure improvements on the manufactured home. 
4. The value of the conso!ldated notes which I now own total some $85,000. 
5. I created a reverse mortgage for the plaintiff since the plaintiff has no 
present income to pay for this consoldiated note. Therefore the value of the note is 
increading exponentially. 
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6. ! coUateralized my note against the manufactured home. 
7. The theft of this home therefore constitutes the theft of my security 
interest in the home. 
8. I contacted Michel Slicker to confirm that the properties had been taken 
and my security interest stolen. I also contacted the co~stable's office in Tyler Texas to 
file~ criminal report. The constable wouldn't file a Criminal report claiming it was a civil 
matter. 
9. I contend that the defendants knew I held the lien .on this unit because the 
title is publicly reported bearing me a.s the lienholder 9nd I had attached to the unit HUD 
labels bearing nie as the lienholder .... 
10. I have suffered the results of the theft in the state of idaho as no collateral 
': ,;, 
is now available to cover my note. I would be willing to intervene on this case if the court 
so permitted as a third party plaintiff. 
Your affiant saith naught, 
Ferron Stokes 




Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certifies that she faxed the foregoing document to the following 
parties or ).\~ ~-2012. 
Brian Julian, Stephen Adams 
250 South Fifth Street Ste 700 
PO Box 7426 
Boise Idaho 83707 
Fax no. 208-344"5510 
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Filed 
2 8 
IN THE DISTRICT COT.JRT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C0~1TY OF ONEIDA 
******* 
Recister No. CV-2011-66 







SANDRA COPELAND; ADMITRA ) 
MILLS; JEANETTE HARMON; CODY ) 
KELLY; PAUL KELLEY JR; THE ) 
THE ESTATE OF PAUL KELLEY SR; ) 
SMITH COUNTY TRUSTEE; TAX ) 
ASSESSOR GARY BARBER; SMITH ) 
COUNTY; ARTIE ROSS; ATTORNEY ) 
TAB BEALL; LAW OFFICES OF ) 
P1JRDUE, BRANDON, FIELDER, ) 
COLLINS & MOTT; LISA NEILSON, ) 




MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELIEF 
FROM THE JUDGMENT 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Relief From the Judgment 
("Motion"), filed March 27, 2012. Plaintiff does not request oral argument and seeks a ruling by 
April 11, 2012. No response to Plaintiffs Motion has been received from the Defendants, and 
because of the time sensitive nature of the issue, the Court issues its ruling at this time. 
Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Relief From .Judgment 
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Plaintiffs Motion is supported by her own affidavit and the affidavits of Ferron Stokes and 
Michel Slicker. Plaintiff correctly notes that a motion for reconsideration is untimely if filed more 
than 14 days after the final judgment. The Court previously refused to vacate the judgment filing 
date and refile the judgment based on Plaintiffs claim that she did not receive it in a timely way. 
Thus, the Judgment was filed on February 29, 2012, and any new motion for reconsideration would 
be untimely. 
Therefore, Plaintiff has couched her Motion as one under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) which allows for 
relief from a final judgment for "any other reason justifying relief ... " Plaintiff does not seek relief 
from the judgment for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b )(1 ); 
because of "newly discovered evidence" under Rule 60(b )(2); for "fraud or other misconduct of an 
adverse party" under Rule 60(b )(3 ); claiming that the "judgment is void" under Rule 60(b )( 4 ); or 
that the judgment has been "satisfied, released, or discharged" under Rule 60(b )( 5). If not for any of 
these reasons, then what is the "other reason" for the Motion? Even the most cursory reading of 
paragraphs 7 through 14 of Plaintiffs affidavit makes it clear that Plaintiff is seeking a review of the 
Court's prior decisions, as applied to the Plaintiffs "Fourth Cause of Act" [sic] in her Complaint, 
which, on its face, alleges a violation of the Utah Criminal Code applicable to communications 
fraud, section 7 6-10-1801. In other words, the Plaintiff, through a Rule 60(b )( 6) motion, is seeking 
reconsideration of the Court's prior decisions. For this reason alone the Motion is inappropriate and 
must be denied. Nevertheless, for clarity, the Court will seek to briefly address some of Lhe issues 
raised by Plaintiff. 
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First, in paragraph 7 of her affidavit, Plaintiff asserts again that this Court refused to take 
evidence Plaintiff wished to offer in opposition to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
This is incorrect and is something the Court has previously addressed. Repeating what this Court 
said: ''Plaintiff objects to an alleged limitation on the consideration of evidence in this case, 
claiming that the Court refused to consider filings after October 2011 and also asserting that 
Defendants 'conspired to and did successfully steal plaintiff's building and construction equipment 
from the property according to a neighbor living by the property.' These allegations are 
unintelligible and unsupported by any record. Plaintiff has made several filings in this case after 
October 2011 up to and including a 'Notice of Filing Re-Notarized Affidavit ... ' filed February 8, 
2012. All of Plaintiff's submissions have been considered by the Court."1 
Secondly, in paragraphs 8 and 9 of her affidavit, Plaintiff asserts at the time of the hearing 
on February 14, 2012, she attempted to amend the Complaint to "include newly accrued RICO 
claims," i.e., alleged attempts by "defendants" to initiate the criminal proceedings filed against 
Plaintiff in Idaho, and claims that the Court would not allow these new allegations. The Court 
rejects this claim. There was no purported amendment of the Complaint, orally or in \Vriting. In 
responding to concerns the Court had over how the Fourth Cause of Action was pleaded, Plaintiff 
did indicate that the Fourth Cause of Action should have asserted a claim under the LC.§ 18-7805, 
a point the Court acknowledged in its decision on the Motion for Reconsideration.2 But there has 
been no attempted amendment to the Complaint and the Court ruled on the motions before it based 
1 Decision on Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3. 
2 Id. "The same is true of the fourth cause of action. That claim, an alleged breach of the Utah Fraudulent 
Communications Act, has since been referenced by Plaintiff as a violation of the Idaho Racketeering Act, ostensibly 
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on the allegations made. As to any assertion ''that the Defendant had stolen mine and Ferron Stokes 
manufactured home on the property, all of our construction equipment and our heavy duty dump 
trailer. .. ,"3 the Court referenced those contentions in the February 29, 2012 order, quoted above. 
The fact is that no such so-called RICO claim was properlv asserted in this case and the final 
judgment has now been entered. 
Third, in paragraph 10 of her affidavit, Plaintiff asserts that she is entitled to pursue new and 
different RICO claims "by consent," referring to I.R.C.P. 15(b). Again Plaintiff misunderstands the 
rule. If evidence is received at trial to support a claim not plead in the complaint the unplead claim 
is tried by consent, express or implied, and the pleadings are amended to conform to the evidence. 
There has been no trial here. Issues raised or opposed in a motion for summary judgment must 
conform to the allegations of the complaint. This Court also responded to that assertion i..1 the 
February 29, 2012 order, stating: "SL.11ce the Court's ruling in this case is based on the pleadings, 
factually supplemented by affidavits, there are no issues that can be 'tried by consent.' They have 
either been alleged in the Complaint or they have not." This claim has no merit. 
Fourth, the Court notes that any so-called RICO claims asserted by Plaintiff, either under 
Utah or Idaho law, were addressed in the Court's order denying her Motion for Reconsideration. 
The analysis for such claims was and is the same as applied to any other alleged tort or act of the 
Defendants. The Court has concluded that there is an insufficient legal basis to assert jurisdiction 
LC.§ 18-7805. No amended Complaint asserting such a claim has been filed in this case and the Court is required 
to analyze this matter on the claims asserted." 
3 Plaintiffs Affidavit,~ 8. See also Slicker Affidavit. 
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over the Defendants who have specially appeared in this matter, considering anv and all of the 
Plaintiffs claims, and the Judgment reflects that decision.4 
Finally, Plaintiff complains that the Judgment itself gives an improper impression as to the 
disposition for those parties who were never served and have not appeared in this action. It is the 
Court's view that the Judgment clearly and accurately reflects both what has occurred in this case 
and the rulings of the Court in the various decisions at issue, and that no amendment of the 
Judgment is required. 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from the Judgment is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 2'l1.h day of March, 2012. 
4 Parenthetically, the Court notes that the alleged RICO claims are tied to assertions that "Defendants" had 
something to do with the initiation of criminal charges against Plaintiff in Idaho and that certain properties of the 
Plaintiff and Ferron Stokes were taken by the "Defendants." Interestingly, Mr. Slicker's Affidavit only asserts that 
"Sandra Coleman [sic], and the Kelly family" were involved. None of those Defendants were properly served and 
have not appeared in any way in this case. Any claims against them have been dismissed for failure to prosecute the 
action. See the Judgment. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the z<tt>- day of March, 2012, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing ORDER to the following person(s) in the manner indicated below: 
Stephen L. Adams 
ANDERSON, JULIA.~ & HULL LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Holli Telford 
10621 South Old Hwy 191 
Malad, ID 83252 
[x] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[x] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[x] E-mail 
Deputy Clerk I J 
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HOLLI TELFORD Q ..; 
AKA HOLLI LUNDAHL 
10621 S. Old Hwy 191 
Malad, Idaho 83252 AT j 0 'Clock AM. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
HOLLI TELFORD . 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SANDRA COLEMAN, et al. 
Defendant 
Case No. CV 2011 - 00066 
OBJECTION TO CERTAIN PORTIONS 
OF THE COURT'S ORDER DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT 
SECOND MOTION FOR LEAVE OF THE 
COURT TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW Plaintiff to object to this court's Order denying plaintiff relief from the 
final judgment entered on February 29, 2012 and to enter her second motion for leave of the 
court to amend the complaint,. even after final judgment. 
On March 28, 2012, this court ruled on plaintiff's motion for relief from judgment. 
The court made several statements in it's order that are incorrect and to which plaintiff now 
objects before filing her notice of appeal in this action. 
1. Rule 60(b )(6) Is A Catchall Provision under the Procedural Codes 
And Addresses Equity Matters That Are Not Laid Out Under Other 
Provisions of Rule 60(b) 
This Court has raised issue with the provision of rule 60(b) that plaintiff employed for 
seeking relief to correct errors in this court's final judgment. Plaintiff selected subdivision (6) 
because she did not receive service of the February 29, 2012 judgment in the mai!, and has 
long contended that service made by mail is being obstructed given the postmaster of the 
Oneida County post office is the wife of an Oneida County Detective. 
Nevertheless, subdivision (6) is a catchall provision, and therefore is proper to 
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address the failure to received timely notice of the final judgment in order to. attack the 
judgment within the 14 day rule after final judgment has been entered. Irrespective, this 
court has properly reached the merits of plaintiff's motion, therefore plaintiff raises objections 
to various findings by the court in it's order. 
2. Plaintiff's Affidavits Are Not Unintelligible And Furthermore Are 
Admissable Evidence Because They Constitute Adoptive Admissions 
Of The Plaintiff To Prove The Truth Of The Matter Stated Or Lay 
Opinion Testimony Based on The Perception Of The Witness 
On page 3, lines 7-8 of the court's order, this court finds plaintiff's affidavit, Ferron 
Stokes affidavit and Michel Slicker's affidavit unintelligible and unsupported by any record. 
This is a remarkable statement by the court. Plaintiff researched every case in Idaho using 
the word unintelligible under the free law libraries available over the internet, and in every 
case using this word, it was used to described the inability to hear or decipher verbal 
statements in recordings, or of a witnesses' statements from afar, or someone's testimony 
from the stand because of mike difficulties, or translation barriers in language of a dec!arant. 
This could hardly be the case in the affidavits provided by plaintiff because they are clear, 
concise and direct. See Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No. 36245 (Idaho 2010) 
(The nonmoving party must come forward with evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, in 
order to survive summary judgment. Kiebert, 144 Idaho at 228, 159 P.3d at 865.); Skelton v. 
Spencer, 565 P.2d 1374; 98 Idaho 417 (ID 1977} (Louise Spencer's affidavit was her 
sole evidence in this case. By testifying to privileged communications, and by making an 
issue of her defense the privileged matter of her relation with her former attorneys, appellant 
Louise Spencer waived the attorney-client privilege for all communications relevant to the 
settlement process.) 
Moreover the facts averred in the affidavit of Slicker are admissible in evidence 
because the stated facts constitute lay opinion testimony with Slicker as a percipient witness 
under l.R.E. 701 see State v. Card, 190 P.3d 930, 146 Idaho 111 (Idaho App. 2008) (Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 701 permits a lay witness to testify in the form of an opinion or inference, if 
the opinion or inference is rationally based on the perception of the witness, and the opinion 
is helpful to the determination of a fact in issue. See Kolln v. Saint Luke's Reg. Medical Ctr., 
· 130 Idaho 323, 330, 940 P.2d 1142, 1149 (1997)). Accordingly, Slicker does not need a 
record to prove the facts stated in his affidavit ; moreover, the local constable would not 
execute a theft report for any of the affiants because they were instructed not to do so by 
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Smith County authorities. 
With respect to the attested averments of Plaintiff and Ferron Stokes, their 
testimonial statements constitute adoptive admissions by a party or party in interest. There 
are several ways in which an adoptive admission occurs: 
a) EXPRESS ADOPTION: The most common type of adoptive admission is one in 
which the adopter expressly acknowledged the statement was true. An express acknow-
ledgment may be solicited or unsolicited. An unsolicited acknowledgement occurs if the 
adopter spontaneously responded to the declarant's statement by saying something like, 
"That's right," "Yeah", "Okay". 
b) IMPLIED ADOPTIONS: An implied adoption occurs if th~ adopter said or did 
something from which it can be reasonably inferred he was acknowledging the truth of 
the declarant's statement. 
Idaho has very little case law on adoptive admissions. However other jurisdictions 
have decisioned that plaintiffs and Ferron Stoke's affidavits meet the adoptive admissions 
rule and therefore qualify as admissible evidence standing alone. These cases hold: 
1 ) People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 624 ["(B)y reason of the adoptive 
admissions rule, once the defendant has expressly or impliedly adopted the statements of 
another, the statements become his own admissions, and are admissible on 
that bases .•• ".]. Same in 6 People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 623. People v. 
Preston (1973) 9 Cal.3d 308, 314 ["An accusatory statement adopted by a party is an 
adoptive admission. "]. 
2 ) Brady v. Pulgar, No. A-4858-06T1 (N.J.Super .App.Div. 2009) (Citing 
Ratnerv. General Motors Corp., 241N.J.Super197, 202 (App. Div. 1990) Under N.J.R.E. 
803(b)(2) ... If a party adopts statements or reports of others by relying on them, the party 
has incorporated and adopted those statements as his own to prove the truth of the matter 
stated. Skibinski v. Smith, 206 N.J. Super. 349, 353-54 (App. Div. 1985)); 
3) Fields v. State, 220 P.3d 709 (Nev. 2009) (When Linda spoke to Fields 
on the jail phone, she complained to Fields that she was in jail because of what Fields did. 
Fields's silence on these telephone accusations from Linda be came adoptive admissions by 
Fields.); 
4) McDevitt v. Bill Good Builders, Inc., 175 N.J. 519, 816 A..2d 164 (N.J. 
2003) (2 McCormick on Evidence§ 254 (Strong ed. 1992) (factual references to crime 
asserted by a third party can be adoptive admissions of a party.); 2 McCormick on Evidence 
§ 261 (Strong ed. 1992); 4 Wigmore on Evidence§ 1072 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). 
5) State v. Shoop, 441 N.W.2d 475, 482 (Minn. 1989) (A nod of the head 
can qualify as an affirmative expression of agreement constituting an adoptive admission.); 
6) State v. Brummer, 568 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1997) (Adoptive admission of a 
statement by silence occurs if, (1) the adopter remained silent after hearing the declarant's 
statement implicating him, (2) the adopter had an opportunity to respond to the statement, and 
(3) he failed to respond. 
, 7) Idaho v. Van Nguyen, 832 P.2d 324; 122 Idaho 151 (ID.App. 1992) 
(The. e~tire t,?Pe-recorded statements of the co-defendants are admitted as Thanh's "adoptive 
adm:~s1ons. ); Jolley~. ?lay, 103Idaho171, 646 P.2d 413 (1982) {employee's statement 
\f\f~C::: ~ C!.t~tPmOnt h r~ II lnf'IO,JC-1 t"r'\- I ,....,+,,.... _,.., .,.....,:....., ...., .-.1..L ~.>-J : 11 -- ._ ___ _,. .1._._ 
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7) Idaho v. Van Nguyen, 832 P.2d 324; 122 Idaho 151 (ID.App. 1992) 
(The entire tape-recorded statements of the co-defendants are admitted as Thanh's "adoptive 
admissions.1' ); Jolleyv. Clay, 103Idaho171, 646 P.2d 413 (1982) (employee's statement 
was 11a statement by [Guidinger's] ... servant concerning a matter within the scope of his ... 
employment, made during the existence of the relationship. Therefore not hearsay.) 
8) Brown v. United States, 464 A.2d 120, 124 (D.C. 1983) (AUSA 
Keenan's approval of the Trainum Affidavit demonstrated that AUSA Keenan manifested an 
intent to adopt the affidavit to prove the truth of the matter asserted.}. 
9) Powers v. Coccia, No. 2004-91-Appeal (R.I. 12/09/2004) (Affidavit is 
an adoptive admission under Rule 801 (d)(2)(B), whereby affiant party, by words or conduct, 
signifies his or her acquiescence or approval of an out-of-court statement. This principle is 
sought to be employed frequently in instances in which there is a conversation with a party in 
which the party agrees with the remarks of the other party." State v. Brennan, 527 A.2d 654, 
655 n.2 (RL 1987). 
10) Pilgrim v. Trustees of Tufts College, 118 F.3d 864, 870 (1st Cir. 1997} 
(There is a well-recognized evidentiaiy principle that there is no requirement that a mdec!arant 
have personal knowledge of the facts underlying [his] statement"' for it to qualify as an 
adoptive admission.) See Brookover v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital,893 F.2d 411, 416 
(1st Cir. 1990); Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc., 588 F.2d 626, 
630-31 (8th Cir. 1978). 
11) United States v. Paulino, 13 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 1994) (the court 
determined that out of court statement regarding occupancy and dominion over a particular 
apartment, presented into evidence by a party, was admissible as an adoptive admission.) 
Here, Michel Slicker offered lay opinion testimony in his affidavit that he and LA 
Greer observed the non-appearing parties stealing plaintiff's personal properties from the 
land that Smith County sold plaintiff. Mr. Slicker also attested that he spoke to the Kelleys 
and Coleman (who did not appear in this action), and these persons represented to Mr 
Slicker that they had the right to steal plaintiff's personal properties because plaintiff lost her 
the suit in Idaho and because plaintiff would be going to prison for a long time based on 
forgery charges being prosecuted against plaintiff by Oneida County authorities on 
defendant's behalf and the behalf of other persons plaintiff had sued. Mr Slicker's affidavit is 
admissable as lay opinion testimony. Furthermore) the statements made in Mr. Slicker's 
Affidavit have been adopted by plaintiff to prove the truth of the matter stated and therefore 
are adoptive admissions by plaintiff. Likewise with the statements made by Ferron Stokes 
who has a property interest in the manufactured home and construction equipment in his 
nn~itirin ri~ a lienholder. Plaintiff has also ?.Ci~ted Ferron Stoke's statements and both 
plaintiff and Ferron Stokes 1-":\ve been willing and ab!e to personP 11 ' 1 appear and testify befor 
this court. Therefore, the affidavits are admissab!e ·ascompetenteV.idence standing, alone 
under rule 56 . 
3. The Court Has Ruled That Plaintiff Cannot Amend Her Complaint 
After Final Judgment Has Been Entered 
This Court had ruled that plaintiff cannot amend her complaint after final judgment 
has been entered. However in Myers v. City of Poctello, 559 P.2d 1136; 98Idaho168 (ID, 
1977), the Supreme Court held that rule 15(a) permits the plaintiff to amend a complaint 
even after final judgment has been entered with leave of the court. Moreover, the appellate 
court will review any rule by the trial court denying plaintiffs motion to amend, as long as the 
appellant shows that she made such a motion in the lower court.). In addition, in Gem State 
Insurance Co. v. Hutchison, 175 P.3d 172, 145Idaho10 (Idaho 2007), this court held that 
oral objection at a summary judgment hearing is sufficient to preserve the right to challenge : 
the admission of evidence; statements in an affidavit, or other acts of the court, on appeal, 
even though that party did not submit a written pre-hearing motion. Vl/e hold that only "some 
form of objection is ordinarily necessary" to "preserve the right to challenge errors on appeal. 
Id.). Here, plaintiff made several oral motions to amend her complaint both before and after 
final judgment. Plaintiff seeks to preserve her objections in this written objection. 
The Court also find that he would still deny jurisdiction in the state of Idaho in spite 
of plaintiffs new RICO allegations of theft by extortion by virtue of the criminal proceedings 
brought against ptaintiff by Oneida County authorities for the purpose of obstructing plaintiff;s 
entitlement to relief this case. 
Dated: April 6, 2012 
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Certificate of Service 
;/ J/2.J.d__ 
_if __ L-11_. ~-- ___ -L.: __ 
... 
by fax and by email on Octt' ·,r 18 1 2011 
Brian K. Julian 
Stephen Ladams 
250 S. Fifth St. Ste 700 
Boise Idaho 83707 
fax no. 208-344~551 O 
conM · 
I !"-Wt! • 
FAX NO. Apr. 08 2012 10:29PM Pl __ , ___ _ 
----
this court Therefore, the affidavits are admissable as competent evidence standing alone 
under rule 56 . 
3. The Court Has Ruled That Plaintiff Cannot Amend Her Complaint 
After Final Judgment Has Been Entered 
This Court had ruled that plaintiff cannot amend her complaint after final judgment 
has been entered. However in Myers v. City of Poctello, 559 P.2d 1136; 98Idaho168 (ID, 
1977), the Supreme Court held that rule 15(a) permits the plaintiff to amend a complaint 
even after final judgment has been entered with leave of the court Moreover, the appellate 
court will review any rule by the trial court denying plaintiff's motion to amend, as long as the 
appellant shows that she made such a motion in the lower court.). In addition, in Gem State 
Insurance Co. v. Hutchison, 175 P.3d 172, 145Idaho10 (Idaho 2007), this court held that 
oral objection at a summary judgment hearing is sufficient to preserve the right to challenge : 
the admission of evidence; statements in an affidavit, or other acts of the court, on appeal, 
even though that party did not submit a written pre-hearing motion. We hold that only "some 
form of objection is ordinarily necessary" to "preserve the right to challenge errors on appeal. 
Id.). Here, plaintiff made several oral motions to amend her complaint both before and after 
final judgment. Plaintiff seeks to preserve her objections in this written objection. 
The Court also find that he would still deny jurisdiction in the state of Idaho in spite 
of plaintiffs new RICO allegations of theft by extortion by virtue of the criminal proceedings 
brought against plaintiff by Oneida County authorities for the purpose of obstructing plaintiff;s 
entitlement to relief this case. <J j k. 
Dated: April 6, 2012 /// 
Holli Telford Lu dahl 
Certificate of Service 
The undersigns that she served the foregoing document on the following parties 
by fax and by email on October 18, 2011 
Brian K. Julian Judge Dunn FacsimilE{(Z08) 236-720w 
Stephen Ladams Oneida County~,Vno. 208-766-299 
250 S. Fifth St Ste 700 ?/~_,..~' J 
Boise Idaho 83707 '.£ JI dJ.---
fax no. 208-344-5510 Holli Teorct LW1dl /I ..., 
1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA 
* * * * * * * 
Register No. CV -2011-66 







SANDRA COPELA.l\JD; ADMITRA ) 
MILLS; JEANETTE HARMON; CODY ) 
KELLY; PAUL KELLEY JR; THE ) 
THE ESTATE OF PAUL KELLEY SR; ) 
SMITH COUNTY TRUSTEE; TAX ) 
ASSESSOR GARY BARBER; SMITH ) 
COUNTY; ARTIE ROSS; ATTORl\TEY ) 
TAB BEALL; LAW OFFICES OF ) 
PURDUE, BRANDON, FIELDER, ) 
COLLINS & MOTT; LISA NEILSON, ) 




ORDER ON PL_i\L~TIFF'S 
OBJECTION TO ORDER 
DENYING RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT 
This Court's Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motion for Relief From the Judgment 
("Decision") was filed on March 28, 2012. That Decision denied Plaintiffs Motion for Relief and 
the Court's analysis of that motion is incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full. Now 
Plaintiff has filed an Objection to Certain Portions of the Court's Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion 
for Relief From Judgment ("Objection"), filed April 9, 2012. No particular relief is sought in 
Order on Plaintifrs Objection 
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Plaintiff's Objection but it appears primarily to be criticisms of the Decision.1 No authority is cited 
in support of the right to file the Objection. The Court has considered the Objection and finds no 
merit to it. The Court stands by the analysis and conclusions of the Decision. Plaintiff seeks no 
relief. Therefore, the Court simply OVERRULES the Objection. 
ITIS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this CJ~ day of April, 2012. 
STEPHEN~ 
District Judge 
1 In subsection 3 of the Objection Plaintiff once again, and incorrectly, asserts that the Court has denied oral motions 
to amend her Complaint to assert new RICO allegations. As noted in the Decision, it is the Court's view that no 
such motion has ever been filed in this case. 
Order on PlaintifPs Objection 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I fIEREBY CERTIFY that on the qtt< day of April, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing ORDER to the following person(s) in the manner indicated below: 
Stephen L. Adams 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Holli Telford 
10621 South Old Hwy 191 
Malad, ID 83252 
Order on Plaintiff's Objection 
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[x] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[x] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[x] E-mail 
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Holli Telford 
10621 S. Old Highway 191 
Malad City, Idaho 83252 
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Sandra Copeland, Attorney Tab Beall, 
Estate Of Paul Kelley Sr., Harmon, 
Jeanette Kelley, Cody Kelley, Paul Jr. 
Kelley, Law Offices Of Purdue, Etal, 
Admitra Mills, Liza Nielsen, Artie 
Ross, Smith County Trustee, Smith 
County, Tax Assessor Gary Barber 
· Defendants 
Case No. 201 l -CV-66 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS, TIIB PARTY'S AITORNEYS bearing address: 
Brian K. Julian 
Stephen I.Adams 
250 S. Fifth St. Ste 700 
Boise Idaho 83707 
fax no. 208-344-5510 
AND THE CLERK OF Tiffi ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN 1HAT: 
1. The above named appellant Holli Telford Lundahl appeals against the above-named 
defendants to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment entered iti the above entitled 
action on February 29, 2012, Honorable Judge Stephen Dunn, presiding. , 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appeal.able orders under and pursuant to Rule (l l(a)(2) 
of the I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then intends to 
assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant 
from asserting other issues on appeal · 
FAX NO. Rpr. 09 2012 03:35P 
~------­
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As to the appearing parties: 
Whether personal jurisdiction exists in the state of Idaho over the vii thin claims under· 
(a) the doing business prong of the Idaho Long Arm Statute; · 
(b) the tortious injury prong of the idaho long arm statute; 
( c) insuring risks of Idaho residents 
(d) because racketeering acts occurred and were completed in the state of Idaho 
(e) Because the Calder effects test required Idaho acquire jurisdiction over the 
acts of the defendant under the Due Process clause; 
As to the non-appearing parties: 
(f) Whether the non-appearing defendants were properly served process under 
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act's long arm service statute; 
(g) Whether plaintiff should have been granted a default judgment against the 
non-appearing defendants for failure to appear. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5.(a) No reporter's tra..'lscript is requested? 
6. The appella.11t requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 











Verified Complaint Filed 
Request For Clerk's Entry Of Default A.nd Default Judgment Pursuant To 
Idaho Rul~s Of Civil Procedure Rule 55(a) And (b)(ll) -Admitra Mills 
Affidavit Of Holli Telford In Support Of Request For Clerk's Entry Of 
Default And Default Judgment Pursuant To Idaho Rules Of Civil 
Procedure Rule 55(a) And (b )(1) -Admitra Mills 
Request For Clerk's Entry Of Default And Default Judgment Pursuant To 
Idaho Rules Of Civil Procedure Rule 55(a) ~<\nd (b)(l) -Sandra Copeland 
Affidavit Of Holli Telford In Support Of Request For Clerk's Entry Of 
Default And Default Judgment Pursuant To Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 55(a) And (b )(1 )- Sandra Copeland 
Request For Clerk's Entry Of Default And Default Judgment Pursuant To 
Idaho Rules Of Civil Procedure Rule 55(a) And (b)(l) ~Paul Kelley Jr. 
Affidavit Of Holli Telford Tn Support Of Request For Clerk's Entry Of 
Default And Default Judgment Pursuant To Idaho Rules Of Civil 
Procedure Rule 55(a) And (b)(l)- Paul Kelley Jr. 
Request For Clerk's Entry Of Default And Default Judgment Pursuant 
To Idaho Rules Of Civil Procedure Rule 55(a)And (b)(l)- Cody Kelley 
Affidavit Of Holli Telford In Support Of Request For Clerk's Entry Of 
Default And Default Judgment Pursuant To ldaho Rules Of Civil 
Procedure Rule 55(a) And (b)(l) - Cody Kelley 
Request For Clerk's Entry Of Default And Default Judgmc11t Pursuant 
-v ---·v ,,_~v ~~ ~A'U J. LV"'""'""'" H.LU\J ..'.l\~jflUU \Uj\_l} - 1111;; w:SU:1~1;: 
1 'aul Kelley Sr. 
06/27/2011 Affidavit OfHol1i Telford In Support Of Request For Clerk's Sntry Of 
Default And Default Judgment Pursuant To Idaho Rules Of Civil 
Procedure Rule 55(a) And (b)(l) - The Estate of Paul Kelley Sr. 
0612712011 Request For Clerk's Entry Of Default And Default Judgment Pursuant. 
To Idaho Rules Of Civil Procedure Ruels 55(a) And (b)(l)- Smith 
County Trustee 
0612712011 Affidavit Of Holli Telford In Support Of Request For Clerk's Entry 
Of Default And Default Judgment Pursuant To Idaho Rules Of Civil 
Procedure Rule 55(a) And (b)(l) - Smith County Trustee 
06/30/2011 Request For Clerk's Entry Of Default And Default Judgment Pursuant 
To Idaho Rules Of Civil Procedure Rucls 55(a) And (b )(1 )-Artie 
Ross 
06/30/2011 Affidavit Of Holli Telford In Support Of Request For Clerk's Entry 
Of Default And Default Judgment Pursuant To Idaho Rules Of Civil 
Procedure Rule 55( a) And (b )(1) -Artie Ross 
07/18/2011 Memorandum Decision 
08/01/2011 Affi.davit OfEiham Neilsen In Opposition To Defendants Smith 
County, Tax Assessor Gary Barber, Attorney Teb Beall And Law 
Offices Of Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins And Mott's Motions To 
Dismiss And Motions For Summary Judgment 
08/01/2011 Affidavit Of L.A. Greer In Opposition To Defendants Smith County, 
Tax Assessor Gary Barber, Attorney Teb Beall And Law Offices Of 
Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins And Mott's Motions To Dismiss 
And Motions For Summary Judgment 
08/01/2011 Affidavit Of Holli Telford fa Opposition To Defendants Smith 
County, Tax Assessor Gary Barber, Attorney Teb Beall And Law 
Offices Of Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins And Mott's Motions 
To Dismiss And Motions For Summary Judgment 
08/01/2011 Affidavit of Kim Vogt in Opposhion to Defendants Smith County, 
Tax Assessor Gary Barber, Attorney Tab Beall and Law Offices of 
Purdue, Brandon, Felder) Collins and Molts Motions to Dismiss and 
Motions for Summary Judgment 
08/24/2011 Order Vacating Hearing 
09/01/2011 Plaintiffs Opposition To The Defendant's Motions To Dismiss 
Sunnorted Rv: (1) ThA Affir1::lv1t nfRA11; T,,.lf.,.,"'rl· t"l\ Tt..~ "il.:.J ___ ~~ 
.. \ ,/ .. , ....... -~,~~·-·-
')f LA Greer; (3) The affidavit Of Elhar "\Tcilsen; ( 4) The Affidavit 
1.f'.'K;.,.,,.. \lr.rr+• ft:..\'('!,.,,, A-A'.':..:I~ .. :+ o+-s T _,t.'~-..- IC\ "\'.Ter1'-C1.,a' Response 
{;.._ • «AA _'-'5'> \-'} -'-U"'fl,_J.J.J.UQ,VH l. • l.JMLl\.;I,.;' \0) Y lJ._, , 
To Court Order Dated August 18, 2011 Cross Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
09/06/2011 Notice to this Court that Plaintiff was not served -with the 
Defendant's Replies filed into the Court Record on August 18, 2011 
until the Clerk tendered copies of these replies to Plaintiff on 
September 2, 2011 
09/16/20l1 Amended Return Of Personal Service On Defendant Smith County 
Assessor Gary Barber 
09/16/2011 Amended Return Of Personal Service On Defendant Tab Beall 
09/16/2011 Amended Return Of Personal Service 011 Defendant The Law 
Offices of Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins @Mott LLP 
09/16/2011 Amended Return Of "Personal Service of on Defendant Smith 
County AKA Smith County Trustee 
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10/03/2011 Memorandum Decision On Defcnd1mts' Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
10/18/2011 IRCP Rule ll(a)(2)(B)Motion For .Reconsideration Of The Court's 
Summary Judgment Entered In Favor Of Gary Barber, Tab Beal, 
Law Offices Of Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins & Mott, And 
Smith County Request For Rule 54(b) Certification After 
Reconsideration Of The Summary Judgment Above Stated Request 
For Rule 54(b) Certification OfTne Rule 68 Settlement Judgment 
Between Lisa Nielsen And Holli Telford Request To Ccrtifiy As A 
Final Judgment Under Rule 54(b) The Court's Order Denying 
Defaults And Default Judgments Against The Remainder 
Defendant's Because Plaintiff Served These Defendants By 
Certified Mail Versus Personal Service Under Idaho's Consumer 
Protection Act's Service Statute As Permitted For Tortfcasors 
Residing Out Of State Motion To Stay The Trial Proceedings As 
To The Remainder Defendants Until Tne Supreme Has Interpreted 
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act's Service Statute 
10/19/2011 Affidavit OfHolli Telford 
11/14/2011 Response To Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration And Request 
For 54(b) Certificate, Filed October 18, 2011 
1 J/21/2011 Affidavit Of Lisa Nielsen Confirming Rule 68 Settlement Judgment 
11/21/2011 Verified Plaintiff's Reply Response To The Defendant's Opposition 
To Plaintiff's IRCP Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) Motion For Reconsideration 
Of The Court's Summary Judgment Entered In Favor Of Gary 
Barber, Tab Beal, Law Offices Of Purdue, Brandon, Felder, 
Collins & Mott, And Smith County And Request For Rule 54(b) 
Certification As To Appearing Parties 
02/08/2012 Notice of filing renotarized affidavit ofholli telford to replace the 
original affidavit of holli telford dated july 18, 2011 and filed in 
opposition to defendants smith county gary barber attorney tab 
beall and law offices ofpurdue brandon felder collins and motts 
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment based on tampering 
wtih the original affidavit by oneida county officials thus 
rendering the original affidavit incompentent 
02/08/2012 Affidavit ofholli telford in opposition to defendants smith county 
tax assessor gary barber attorney tab beall and law offices of 
purdue brandon folder collins and motts motions to dismiss and 
motions for summary judgment 
02/29/2012 Minute Entry and Order 
02/29/2012 Memorandum Decision On Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration 
Re: Smith County Texas; Smith County Tax Assessor Gary 
Barber; Attorney Tab Beall; Law Offices Of Perdue, Brandon, 
Fielder, Collins & Mott 
02/29/2012 Judgment . 
03/15/2012 Motions To: (1) Vacate Filing Date Of February 29, 2012 
Memorandum Decision And Final Judgment Entered In The 
Above Stated Case On The Grounds That Plaintiff Was Not Served 
4, 
A Copy Of These Rulings, (2) Refile These Documents Into The 
Docket With A New Filing Date So That Plaintiff Is Not Prejudiced 
From Objecting To Any Matter In These Rulings U on Receiving 
FRX NO. Rpr. 09 2012 03:38P 
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06/27/2011 Request for Clerk's Entry Of Default And Default Judt:,rmcnt Pru:suant 
To Idaho Rules Of Civil Procedure Ruels 55(a) And (b)(1) ~ Sm1th 
County Tm.'>tee 
06/27/2011 Affidavit Of Holli Telford In Support Of Request For Clerk's Entry 
Of Default And Default Judgment Pursuant To Idaho Rules Of Civil 
Procedure Rule 55(a) And (b)(l)- Smith County Trustee 
06/30/2011 Request For Clerk's Entry Of Default And Default Judgment Pursuant 
To Idaho Rules Of Civil Procedure Ruels 55(a)And (b)(l)-."'ctie 
·Ross 
06/30/2011 Affidavit Of Holli Telford In Support Of Request For Clerk's Entry 
Of Default And Default Jud&,rment Pursuant To Idaho Rules Of Civil 
Procedure Rule 55(a) And (b)(l)-Ml.e Ross 
07 /18/2011 Memorandum. Occision 
08/01/2011 Affidavit OfE1ham Neilsen In Opposition To Defendants Smith 
County, Tax Assessor Gary Barber, Attorney Teb Beall And Law 
Offices Of Purdue, Brandon, Felder, CollinsA.nd Mott's Motions To 
Dismiss And Motions For Summary Judgment 
08/01/2011 Affidavit Of L.A. Greer In Opposition To Defendants Smith County, 
Tax Assessor Gary Barber, Attorney Teb Beall And Law Offices Of 
Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collill$ And Mott's Motions To Dismiss 
And Motions For Summary Judgment 
08/0112011 Affidavit Of Holli Telford In Opposition To Defendants Smith 
County, Tax Assessor Gary Barber, Attorney Teb Beall And Law 
Offices Of Pw-due, Brandon, Felder, Collins And Mott's Motions 
To Dismiss And Motions For Summary Ju~oment 
OS/01/2011 Affidavit of Kim Vogt in Oppo:;;ition to Defendants Smith County, 
Tax Assessor Gary Barber, Attorney Tab Beall and Law Offices of 
Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins and Motts Motions to Dismiss and 
Motions for Summary Judgment 
08/24/2011 Order Vacating Hearing 
09/01/2011 Plaintiff's Opposition To The Defendant's Motions To Dismiss 
Supported By: (1) The Affidavit Of Holli Telford; (2) The Affidavit 
of LA Greer; (3) The affidavit OfElham Neilsen; (4) The Affidavit 
OfKim Vogt; (5) The Affidavit Of S. Dillfee; (6) Verified Response 
To Court Order Dated August 18, 2011 Cross Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
09/06/2011 Notice to this Courtthat Plaintiff was not served with the 
. De~endan:'s Replies filed in:o the Court Record on August 18, 2011 
until the Clerk tendered copies of these replies to Plaintiff 011 September 2, 2011 · · 
09/16/2011 Amended Return Of Personal Service On Defendant Smith Countv 
Assessor Gary Barber "' 
09/16/2011 Amended Return Of Persona! Service On Defendant Tab Beall 
09/16/2011 ~-ended RetuIT). Of Personal Service On Defendant The Law 
Oilices of Purdue, Brandon, Felder, Collins (W, Mott LLP 
09/16/2011 Amended Return Of "Personal Service of on Defondant Sm ·th 
County AKA Smith County Trustee 
1 
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FROM FAX NO. 09 2012 03:40PM P2 
A Copy Of These Rulings, (2) Refile These Documents Into The 
Docket With A New Filing Date So That Plc>jntiffis Not Prejudiced 
From Objecting To Any Matter In These Rulings Upon Receiving 
Notice OfThemAnd (3) Order That All Process Be Served Upon 
Plainti:ffElectronicaHy Due To Perjured Service Certificates By 
Oneida County Clerk Diane Skidmore 
03/27/2012 Affidavit Of Holli Telford Asserting Numerous Errors In The 
Court's February 29, 2012 Judgment And Moving For ReliefFrom 
That Judgment Pursuant To LR.C.P. Rule 60(b)(6) 
03/28/2012 Affidavit Of Michel Slicker Supporting: Piaintill's Attack On 
February 29, 2012 JudgmentAnd Moving For Relief From That 
Judgment Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 60(b )( 6) 
03/28/2012 Affidavit Of Ferron Stokes Supporting: Plaintiff's Attack On 
February 29, 2012 JudgmentAi:id Moving For ReliefFrom That 
Judgment Pursuant To I.R.C.P. Rule 60(b )(6) . 
03/28/2012 Memorandum Decision On Plaintiff's Motion For Relief From The 
Judgment 
04.09/2012 Objection To Certain Portions OfThe Court's Order Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion For Relief From Judgment 
FROM : FAX NO. Apr. 09 2012 03:41PM Pl 
7. I certify: (a) that a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on: 
Defendant's attorney 
Brian K. Julian 
Stephen LAdams 
250 S. Fifth St Ste 700 
Boise Idaho 83707 
fax no. 208-344~5510 
(2) []That appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for preparation of the record 
because appellant is indogent. 
(2) [ ] That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because appellant is indogent. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20 (and 
the attorney general ofidaho pursuant to § 67~ 1401(1 ), Idaho Code). 
(\Vb.en certification is made by a party instead of the party's attorney the follo'wi.ng affidavit must 
be executed pursuant to I.A.R. Rule 17(i)) 
State of Utah ) 
c_, . :si ,,_ .h? 
Countyof ~urr~·) 
~ ~ , being sworn, deposes and says: 
That the party is e appellant in the above-entitled appeal, and that all statements in this 
notice of a true and co ct to the best of bis or her knowledge and belief. 
Sign.a pellant 
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this h day of~ 20 lu 
(SEAL)G{ . I ~· '· l~L IL:__~~ 
Title ' 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
RANDI K JACKSON 
Cort1mission # 576162 
My C~n Expllw 
Octob9r 111, 2012 · 
STATE OF UTAH 
Filed 
q '•Y 1\ K 
0 . 
AT 5;;( 
IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN A~"D FOR THE COUNTY OF 01\IEIDA 
******* 
Register No. CV-2011-66 







SANDRA COPELAND; ADMITRA ) 
MILLS; JEANETTE HARMON; CODY ) 
KELLY; PAUL KELLEY JR; THE ) 
THE ESTATE OF PAUL KELLEY SR; ) 
S:MITH COUNTY TRUSTEE; TAX ) 
ASSESSOR GARY BARBER; S:MITH ) 
COUNTY; ARTIE ROSS; ATTORNEY ) 
TAB BEALL; LAW OFFICES OF ) 
PURDUE, BRANDON, FIELDER, ) 
COLLINS & MOTT; LISA 1\TEILSON, ) 
AND DOES 1 - 10, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR \V AIVER OF 
CLERK'S RECORD FEE 
3 2012 
Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal of the Judgment in this case on April 9, 2012. 
Contemporaneously Plaintiff filed a "Motion and Affidavit for fee waiver for Appeal." By Order 
filed April 10, 2012 the Court recommended that Plaintiff's Motion, as it applied to appellate filing 
fee, pursuant to I.AR. 23(d), be granted by the Idaho Supreme Court. The Court notes that 
Plaintiff's original motion did not specify which appellate fees she was asking the Court to consider 




and no objection to the Court's April 10, 2012 Order was filed. However, apparently the Idaho 
Supreme Court has given Plaintiff notice of an intent to dismiss her appeal because she has not paid 
the Clerk's Record fee. She now seeks an additional order from this Court waiving that fee. She 
asserts that this Court "erroneously limited those fees [i.e. the fees the Court recommended be 
waived] to filing fees only when plaintiff asked for waiver of all fees associated with an appeal on 
the court's orders." The Court disagrees. The original motion did not specify which fees Plaintiff 
wished waived and can be easily read to be limited to the appeal filing fee. It is incumbent on the 
party making a motion to be clear in the relief sought Nevertheless, the Court considers the 
Plaintiff's new motion for waiver of the Clerk's Record fee. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 27(f) and LC.§ 31-3220, the district court is to determine 
a request for waiver of Clerk's Record fee. Having considered Plaintiff's request, the Court grants 
Plaintiff's request for a waiver of the Clerk's Record fee. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 3rd day of May, 2012. 
STFnIBM~ 
District Judge 
Order on PlaintifPs Motion for Wavier of Clerk's Record Fee 
Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3",;l day of May, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing ORDER to the follO\ving person(s) in the manner indicated below: 
Stephen L. Adams 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Holli Telford 
10621 South Old Hv.'Y 191 
Malad, ID 83252 
[x] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[x] U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[x] E-mail 
Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Wavier of Clerk's Record Fee 
Page3 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
* * * * * * * 
HOLLI TELFORD ) 
) 




SAi1\JDRA COPELAND; ADMITRA ) 
MILLS; JEANETTE HARMON; CODY ) 
KELLY; PAUL KELLEY JR; THE ) 
ESTATE OF PAUL KELLEY SR; ) 
SMITH COUNTY TRUSTEE; TAX ASSESSOR ) 
GARY BARBER; SMITH COUNTY; AR TIE ) 
ROSS; ATTORNEY TAB BEALL; LAW ) 
OFFICES OF PURDUE, BRANDON, FIELDER, ) 
COLLINS & MOTT; LISA NEILSON; Ai'ID ) 
DOES 1 - 10, ) 
) 
Defendant/ Respondents. ) 
DISTRICT COURT 
CASE NO. CV-2011-66 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
SUPREME COURT No. 39878-2012 
I, Diane Skidmore, Deputy Court Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for Oneida County, do hereby certify that the following is a list of the 
exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as 
indicated: NONE 
IN WITNESS \VHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this day 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - Page 1 
Supreme Court# 39878-2012 
Oneida County# CV-2011-66 
Mt\ TTHEW L. COLTON 
Clerk of the District Court 
cc: Holli Telford 
Stephen L. Adams 
Idaho Supreme Court 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - Page 2 
Supreme Court# 39878-2012 
Oneida County# CV-2011-66 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HOLLI TELFORD ) 
) 




SANDRA COPELAND; ADMITRA ) 
MILLS; JEANETTE HARMON; CODY ) 
KELLY; PAUL KELLEY JR; THE ) 
ESTATE OF PAUL KELLEY SR; ) 
SMITH COlJNTY TRUSTEE; TAX ASSESSOR ) 
GARY BARBER; SMITH COlTNTY; ARTIE ) 
ROSS; ATTORNEY TAB BEALL; LAW ) 
OFFICES OF PURDUE, BRANDON, FIELDER, ) 
COLLINS & MOTT; LISA NEILSON; AND ) 
DOES 1-10, ) 
) 
Defendants/ Respondents. ) 
DISTRICT COURT 
CASE NO. CV-2011-66 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
SUPREME COURT No. 39878-2012 
I, Diane Skidmore, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Oneida, do hereby certify that the foregoing Clerk's 
Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction, and contains true 
and correct copies of all pleadings, documents and papers designated to be included under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross-Appeal, and any additional 
documents requested to be included. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - Page 1 
Supreme Court# 39878-2012 
Oneida County# CV-2011-66 
- 41~ .... 
I do further certify, that all documents, x-rays, charts and pictures, offered or admitted in 
the above entitled cause, if any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with 
the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record, if requested, (except for exhibits NONE , which 
are retained in the possession of the undersigned), as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
District Court at Malad, Idaho, this 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - Page 2 
Supreme Court# 39878-2012 
Oneida County# CV-2011-66 
MATTHEW L. COLTON 
Clerk of the District Court 
Deputy Court Clerk 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
* * * * * * * 
HOLLI TELFORD, ) 
) 




SANDRA COPELAND; ADMITRA ) 
MILLS; JEANETTE HARMON; CODY ) 
KELLY; PAUL KELLEY JR; THE ) 
ESTATE OF PAUL KELLEY SR; ) 
SMITH COUNTY TRUSTEE; TAX ASSESSOR ) 
GARY BARBER; SMITH COlJNTY; ARTIE ) 
ROSS; ATTOR.NEY TAB BEALL; LAW ) 
OFFICES OF PURDUE, BRANDON, FIELDER, ) 





CASE NO. CV-2011-66 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SUPREME COURT No. 39878-2012 
I, Diane Skidmore, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Oneida, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I have personally 
mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, on the--=..;;__ 2012, one 
(1) copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the parties or their Attorney of Record as follows: 
To: Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Holli Telford 
10621 South Old Hwy. 191 
Malad, ID 83252 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - Page 1 
Supreme Court #39878-2012 
Oneida County #CV-2011-66 
To: Counsel for Defendants/Respondents 
Stephen L. Adams 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the 
seal of the said Court this -211!: day 
cc: Idaho Supreme Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - Page 2 
Supreme Court #39878-2012 
Oneida County #CV-2011-66 
MATTHEW L. COLTON 
Clerk of the District Court 
Deputy Clerk 
- Lt~\ -
